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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the results of a survey instrument administered to a random sample 
of New York City security officers in order to understand the relationship between job 
training and turnover and, in turn, the effect of high turnover on the preparedness and 
effectiveness of that population in performing its duties. Replicating a 2004 survey 
sponsored by the New York City Public Advocate Office, which exposed poor training 
and rampant turnover among security guards and resulted in the August 2005 New York 
State Enhanced Security Guard Training legislation, this thesis seeks to determine 
changes in and correlations among those phenomena by employing bivariate analysis, 
independent t-test, and Cronbach’s Alpha methods. The data analysis reveals correlations 
between employment conditions—including training and advancement opportunities—
and retention, and thus contributes to the discourse surrounding the role of private-sector 
and nonsworn personnel in the Homeland Security Enterprise. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. DEMANDS PLACED ON LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Since September 11, 2001, there have been increased demands placed on local 
law enforcement agencies in the domain of terrorism prevention. One of the demands is 
the identification and assessment of risk to critical infrastructure. Although local law 
enforcement has the ability to assess these locations, they do not have the capacity to 
protect these locations. The private sector owns and operates 85 percent of the critical 
infrastructure in the United States (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). The majority of 
these locations are protected by private security companies, putting these private security 
officers on the front line of preventing a possible attack on one of these critical facilities. 
Neither law enforcement nor private security can accomplish these endeavors alone. 
Law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to staff these facilities. 
According to a review of the most recent U.S. data on employment in local and state law 
enforcement, the years 2000 through 2004 showed a period of slow growth. The number 
of sworn police officers in state police organizations increased by one to two percent and 
six percent for sheriffs’ departments. In contrast, the number of sworn officers decreased 
in 20 of the nation’s 50 largest police departments, including six of the seven largest. The 
New York Police Department saw a 10.7 percent decrease in sworn officers, with even 
greater declines in Newark in New Jersey (down 11.4 percent), Cleveland (down 14.4 
percent), Nassau County in New York (down 15.3 percent), and Detroit (down 15.5 
percent) (Reaves, 2007, p. 4). The New York Police Department has continued this 
downward trend in sworn officers. As of July 1, 2010, the NYPD Personnel Bureau 
reported that in 2001 there were 40,800 sworn officers, which was the Department’s 
highest number (Seifman, 2011). The current level of sworn officers is 34,385, a 16 
percent decline in personnel from the highs of 2001. In addition to the 16 percent decline 
in personnel, there is the potential for continued declines due to the fact that 11,534 
officers are eligible to retire between 2010 and the end of 2013. This figure is an estimate 
based on the size of the police academy classes hired twenty years earlier in 1990, 1991, 
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1992, and 1993 and a police officer’s eligibility to retire after twenty years’ service in 
New York City. (NYPD Personnel Bureau, personal communication July 1, 2010). This 
decline is equal to one-third of the current active force strength. The current staffing 
levels and the recruitment and retention problems that law enforcement agencies are 
encountering leads this author to believe that the need exists to develop partnerships with 
private sector security. These partnerships could help supplement the decline in personnel 
needed to protect these critical infrastructure facilities. 
Although private security officers could help supplement law enforcement in a 
partnership, private security officers currently do not have the training, expertise, or 
knowledge gathered from intelligence information to effectively protect these facilities on 
their own. This lack of expertise is due to a number of factors, including low wages paid 
to security officers and minimal benefits, which usually causes a high turnover rate. The 
national annual median wage for a security officer/guard in 2008 was $23,820 
(Occupational Employment and Wages: Security Guards, 2009, p. 1). During that same 
year the median wage of a landscaper/grounds keeper was $23,480 (Occupational 
Employment and Wages: Landscaping and groundskeeping workers, 2009, p. 1). With 
such poor wages and benefits, few security officers stay on the job for long, often 
resulting in inexperienced, poorly trained officers. A recent report on the private security 
services industry in the United States estimates that annual employee turnover in the 
industry exceeds 100 percent for many security companies and can be as high as 300 to 
400 percent for smaller firms. These turnover rates rival those of the fast-food industry 
and pose a serious risk to public safety as private security officers often are first 
responders to life-threatening emergencies (Service Employees International Union 
[SEIU], 2010, p. 1). 
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B. PROBLEM SPACE 
1. Problem 
The Public Advocate for the City of New York, in an attempt to address these 
issues, conducted a research study in 2004/2005 and determined that the standards and 
training for its security officers needed improvement. It concluded that, despite the 
heightened security alerts that the city had been under since 2001, neither the city leaders 
nor private building owners had taken the initiative to train security officers to respond to 
terrorism, interface with police, or work with firefighters during an emergency. The 
Public Advocate’s Office interviewed over 100 privately contracted security officers who 
worked in 39 major Class A commercial buildings1 and found that minimal training and 
limited enforcement of training requirements, combined with low pay, had left New York 
with a private security force that was ill-prepared to protect its public (Sheppard & 
Mintz-Roth, 2001, p. 1). 
This report came to a number of conclusions, such as that security officer’s wages 
were low and that healthcare benefits were unfavorable or not offered. Turnover was 
rampant: nearly one-quarter of security officers stayed at their job for one year or less. 
The high turnover rate in New York was due to low wages and lack of opportunity. New 
York State’s low training standards had not been revised since 1992 and were outdated. 
Most of the security officers surveyed reported having less training than New York State 
required. The training that was required failed to emphasize terrorism awareness, or 
working with the police and firefighters.  
Given the enormity of the responsibility for the protection of the public and the 
fact that most of the infrastructure is privately owned, representing billions of dollars to 
the United States economy, this privately owned infrastructure represents nearly every 
imaginable potential target for terrorists. There is a need to develop some minimum 
                                                 
1 Class A buildings are the most prestigious buildings competing for premier office users with rents 
above average for the area. Buildings have high quality standard finishes, state of the art systems, 
exceptional accessibility, professionally managed and a definite market presence. 
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training standards and other professional guidelines for security officers since countless 
lives are at stake. Many reports and studies herein make reference to both security 
officers and security guards. For the purpose of this research study, these titles will be 
considered interchangeable.  
The Public Advocate of the City of New York, in conjunction with the New York 
City Council, made recommendations based on research findings and New York City 
Council Resolution-569/04 (resolution calling upon the New York State legislature to 
allow municipal legislative bodies to adopt more stringent legislation in relation to 
training, background checks, and licensing/registration for private security personnel) 
(New York City Council, 2004). A recommendation was made to the state legislature to 
adopt legislation requiring additional hours of prelicensing instruction in addition to the 
eight hours of training required at the time. The Public Advocate and the City Council 
recommended that the training curriculum be revised and strengthened to reflect current 
security concerns, such as terrorism, and that the curriculum be updated regularly to 
address evolving trends. 
New York State did not institute all of the recommendations that the City Council 
and the New York City Public Advocate made. However, New York State did make 
available a tax break for building owners who had their security officers participate in a 
40-hour enhanced security training course. In addition, if the security officer participated 
in the training, a compensation of increased hourly wages was awarded. There are a 
number of reports and studies relating to the benefits of job training. 
Time spent in training, training methodologies, and type of training were 
determined to be significant in their relationship to job training satisfaction. The most 
preferred training methodology by employees was face-to-face instruction by an 
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instructor or job coach in both studies. Schmidt found a correlation between job training 
satisfaction and overall job satisfaction in both studies.2 
In the study conducted in 2007, Schmidt determined that his results concurred 
with prior studies conducted on professional occupations, suggesting that the relationship 
between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for employees in a 
variety of occupational categories. 
2.  Argument 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) prepared a report in 2004 titled 
“Guarding America: Security Guards and U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection.” This 
report stated that the effectiveness of critical infrastructure guards in countering a terrorist 
attack depends on the number of guards on duty, their qualifications, pay, and training  
(Parfomak, 2004, p. 2). This is true not only for security officers protecting critical 
infrastructure but for security officers in general. The dynamics of the threat have 
changed a bit; the threat is purely economic damage through fear, as stated in the 
November 2010 issue of Inspire magazine. The modus operandi is through the dispersal 
of explosive packages, dubbed Operation Hemorrhage by Qa’Idah al-Jihad in the Arabian 
Peninsula. In the November 2010 special issue the group boasts about how it only spent 
$4,200 to take down one United Parcel Service (UPS) plane and shipped explosives on 
two others, a UPS plane and a FedEx plane (Qaeda, 2010, p. 7). Their intent is to attack 
the American economy, as depicted in a picture in the same magazine of a bar of gold 
spilling blood (Qaeda, 2010, p. 9). These packages would have eventually and could still 
be shipped to a facility that in all likelihood is protected by security officers who have to 
either detect or respond to the aftermath of the explosion of one of these devices. In 
addition, the current target spectrum has been expanded to include private organizations 
that can have an effect on the U.S. economy. 
                                                 
2 In two studies conducted in 2004 and 2007, Schmidt came to similar conclusions. He found a 
significant relationship in 2004 and a high correlation in 2007 between job training satisfaction and overall 
job satisfaction among employees. The survey conducted in 2004 was a sample of customer and technical 
service employees in nine different organizations in the United States and Canada. The sample size in the 
2004 study was 552 employees with 301 employees responding to the surveys (Schmidt, 2004). The same 
data set was also used in the 2007 study (Schmidt, 2007). 
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Security officers are on the front lines with regard to detecting and possibly 
thwarting a terrorist incident at a facility that they are protecting. If an incident happens at 
their facility, security officers will most certainly be the first on the scene. Tenants or 
personnel assigned to these facilities will be looking for guidance from these security 
officers. Because of this, it is important that security officers receive the proper training 
to enable them to handle these situations professionally. 
Half of all the states lack any requirement for training security officers, and 14 
require less than three days of general security officer training. Despite the size of the 
security industry and its impact on public safety, there are few local, state, or federal 
standards in the United States to maintain quality. There are few legal standards to 
determine who should be able to serve as a security officer and what type of safety 
training and other skills officers should have. Therefore, training is often left in the hands 
of security contractors who want to keep costs to a minimum and put security officers on 
the job quickly in order to overcome high-turnover rates (SEIU, 2010, p. 1). 
Although security officers are the first line of defense in the protection of critical 
infrastructure, no new standards have been established to address the lack of proper 
training. A wide chasm in requirements for training and background checks exists among 
the states, and there has been no unifying force to address these issues. The federal 
government has issued a directive in an attempt to address the issue of critical 
infrastructure protection but no directives to address the lack of a minimum national 
criterion for security officers employed to protect the infrastructure. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure and key resources. The act assigns the DHS the responsibility for 
developing a comprehensive national plan for securing critical infrastructure and key 
resources. In response to this, DHS issued recommendations for jurisdictions seeking to 
improve collaboration with their private-sector agency counterparts (Homeland Security 
Act, 2002).  
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In 2003, the president issued presidential directives to address a number of issues 
facing this nation after 9/11, as depicted in Figure 1. Presidential directives are 
presidential orders that establish national policies, priorities, and guidelines to strengthen 
U.S. homeland security. One of the issues addressed by the presidential directives was 
critical infrastructure and key resources protection. The national approach for critical 
infrastructure and key resources protection was provided through the unifying framework 
established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 [HSPD-7]. This directive 
established policy for enhancing protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key 
resources and mandated a national plan to actuate the policy. In HSPD-7 the President 
designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal official to lead 
CIKR protection efforts among federal departments and agencies, state and local 
governments, and the private sector (HSPD-7, 2003, p. 1). HSPD-7 establishes a central 
source for coordinating best practices and supporting protective programs across and 
within government agencies, as well as establishing structures to enhance close 
cooperation between the private sector and government at all levels to initiate and sustain 
an effective CIKR protection program (Chertoff, 2009, p. 16). HSPD-7 mandated 
development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan as the primary vehicle for 
implementing the CIRK protection policy. 
While HSPD-7 does not require specific action from the private sector, it sets the 
groundwork for agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical 
infrastructure. HSPD-8 establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United 
States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies and is a companion directive to HSPD-5 (HSPD-8, 




Figure 1.   Goal in Context, Department of Homeland Security 
In HSPD-5, the president specifically directed the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to create a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS) to 
provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to 
work effectively together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, 
regardless of cause, size, or complexity. HSPD-5 also requires the DHS secretary to 
coordinate efforts to develop and implement the National Response Plan, which is now 
known as the National Response Framework (NRF) using the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) to provide the structure and mechanisms for policy and 
operational direction (HSPD-5, 2003, p. 3). NIMS provides a uniform doctrine for 
command and managerial control, including incident command, multiagency 




incident (Chertoff, 2009, p. 74). NIMS provides a common flexible framework within 
which government and private entities at all levels can work together to manage domestic 
incidents of any magnitude (Chertoff, 2006). 
The central component of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS 
was refined over many years by incident commanders at the federal, state, and local 
levels and was being successfully implemented throughout the country prior to being 
included in NIMS. The ICS provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual 
responders and agencies as they respond to and help manage an incident (Townsend, 
2006, p. 13). 
The protection of critical infrastructure has been discussed since September 11, 
2001. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Assets defines building human capital as related to personnel surety as the fundamental 
need to ensure that trustworthy, reliable, and trained personnel are available to protect 
critical infrastructure and key assets from terrorist attack. 
Private sector owners and operators rely on skilled employees to protect 
critical infrastructure. Security personnel and first responders in particular 
require adequate training, equipment, and other support to carry out their 
responsibilities effectively and with some degree of assurance that their 
personal security will not be in jeopardy while accomplishing their 
mission. (National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets, 2003, p. 28) 
In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted. A 
section of this act, section 6402, was named the Private Security Officer Act of 2004. 
This section authorized a fingerprint based criminal-history check of state and national 
criminal-history records to screen prospective and current private security officers 
(Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act, 2004). This section allows 
states to be able to opt out of the provisions of this act or to conduct checks under the 
auspices of Public Law 92-544, which gives the states the statutory authority to perform 
state and national fingerprint checks. The problem with the Private Security Officer Act 
of 2004 was that there was no uniformity on the type of background checks being 
conducted, if any at all. Some states conduct state background checks, some states 
 10
conduct federal background checks, and some states conduct no background checks. 
Another issue not addressed is the requirement for training individuals as required under 
the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Assets, which states, “There is an urgent need for ongoing training of security personnel 
to sustain skill levels and to remain up-to-date on evolving terrorist weapons and tactics” 
(National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 
2003, p. 29). These individuals were hired to protect what has been designated as critical 
infrastructure under HSPD-7. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, along with HSPD-5, 7, and 8 were the precursors 
to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
The federal government addressed the issues of background checks and training 
in 1995 after the Oklahoma City bombing with regard to federal facilities and security 
officers hired to protect them under President Bill Clinton (Reese and Tong, 2010, p. 1). 
The Private Security Officer Act of 2004 did not address these same issues in the same 
way. 
a. Federal Minimum Security Standards 
After the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City on 
April 19, 1995, President Clinton directed the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assess the 
vulnerability of federal facilities to terrorist attacks and violence and to develop 
recommendations for minimum security standards (Reese and Tong, 2010, p. 1). Prior to 
this bombing of a federal facility, the federal government had no established security 
standards for federally owned or leased facilities (United States Marshals Service 
[USMS], 1995, p. 1-1). The Marshals Service within the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
was tasked with conducting security assessments of federal facilities after the bombing of 
the Murrah Building (GAO, 2002, p. 5). 
The USMS assembled two working groups to accomplish these tasks, a 
standard committee and a profile committee. The profile committee was tasked with 
conducting a survey of a representative sample of federal facilities to determine their 
existing situations and to identify future security enhancements and costs to protect these 
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facilities. The other working group was the standards committee, which consisted of 
security specialists and representatives from DOJ, including representatives from the FBI. 
This committee also included representatives from the U.S. Secret Service, the General 
Services Administration (GSA), the State Department, the Social Security 
Administration, and the Department of Defense. This committee was tasked with 
identifying and evaluating the various types of security measures that could be used to 
counter potential vulnerabilities at federal facilities. The committee, after conducting its 
review and identifying vulnerabilities at federal facilities, established recommended 
minimum security standards for federal facilities (USMS, 1995, p. 2-6). The 
recommended minimum security standards included physical measures to be 
implemented at federal facilities and the establishment of standardized qualifications and 
training requirements for unarmed and armed contract security officers employed to 
protect federal facilities. In addition, the committee also recommended security officers’ 
attendance at annual security awareness training and the establishment of law 
enforcement agency and security liaisons for the purpose of intelligence sharing (USMS, 
1995, p. 2-9). 
The standards committee also recommended that the Federal Protective 
Service (FPS) be responsible for providing security services for General Service 
Administration–controlled federal facilities through the use of both federal police officers 
(FPOs) and contract security officers. There was also the recommendation that FPS 
should improve the standards for contract security officers by raising the hiring 
qualifications and providing enhanced training (USMS, 1995, p. 4-5). 
The federal government implemented the recommendations of the USMS 
Vulnerabilities Assessment and now requires that all security officers protecting federal 
facilities undergo background suitability checks and complete approximately 128 hours 
of training before being assigned to a post or an area of responsibility. The Federal 
Protective Service is responsible for the protection of federal facilities and overseeing the 
security contractors who are hired to provide additional services, as recommended by the 
standards committee. The required training is provided by the contractor or FPS; the  
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training includes eight hours of x-ray and magnetometer training, and guards must pass 
an FPS-administered written examination and possess the necessary certificates, licenses, 
and permits as required by the contract.  
Figure 2 shows the training and certification that FPS requires its security 
officers to obtain before standing post, and which in addition they must maintain during 
the course of their employment. FPS also requires its security officers to complete 40 
hours of refresher training every two to three years, depending on the terms of the 
contract. Some of the key responsibilities of FPS’s security officers include controlling 
access, enforcing property rules and regulation, detecting and reporting criminal acts, and 
responding to emergency situations involving the safety and security of the facility. 
Security officers may only detain, not arrest, an individual, and their authority typically 
does not extend beyond the facility (GAO, 2009, pp. 7, 8). 
These federal facilities are located in regions all over the country, as 
depicted in Figure 3. They are located in close proximity not only to state and city 
facilities but also to privately owned facilities; however, the requirements for the security 
officers hired to protect these facilities is not the same. A security officer hired in New 
York State is required to complete eight hours of classroom training and an additional 16 
hours of on-the-job training, for a total of 24 hours of training and an eight-hour annual 
refresher training course. Even discounting the 40 hours of firearms training from the 
federal requirement, the security officer is still required to complete 88 hours of training 
before taking a post in a federal facility, as compared to the eight hours required in New 
York State for an unarmed security officer. The federal requirement for security officers 
also requires 40 hours of refresher training every two to three years, compared to eight 
hours a year in New York State. These buildings being protected—whether federal, state, 
city, or privately owned facilities—can be located right next to each other: the 
preparedness of the individuals protecting them is different, but the responsibilities are 
the same. As stated earlier, some states have no requirements for security officer training. 
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Figure 2.   Guard Training and Certification Required by FPS. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 laid the groundwork for the 
establishment of public/private partnerships to help protect and prevent a terrorist attack 
on the critical  infrastructure that was identified and prioritized under HSPD-7. The 
Homeland Security Act built onto the already established principles of the community 
policing initiatives that had been established in the 1980s. These initiatives were 
originally established to engage the community and the private sector/private security in 
joint efforts to reduce crime.  
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Figure 3.   Number of FPS Guards and Federal Facilities with  
Guards by Region. 
To prevent terrorism, the DHS recommended that public and private 
agencies carry out the following: 
Prepare memoranda of understanding and formal coordination agreements 
describing mechanisms for exchanging information regarding vulnerabilities and risks; 
Use community policing initiatives, strategies, and tactics to identify 
suspicious activities related to terrorism; 
Establish a regional, prevention information command center; 
Coordinate the flow of information regarding infrastructure. 
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b. Traditional Law Enforcement Practices 
Traditional law enforcement practices were reactive. They emphasized 
measures such as arrest rates and response times as measures for responses to crime. 
Community policing was designed to encourage police to proactively solve community 
problems by addressing the factors that contribute to crime, rather than police response to 
crime. Community policing can be defined as a philosophy that promotes organizational 
strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques 
that proactively address the immediate conditions, such as crime, social disorder, and fear 
of crime, that give rise to public-safety issues (Community Policing Defined, 2010, p. 3). 
Through this transformation, community policing theoretically reflects the 
background of American policing and contributes to the reduction in crime by partnering 
with the community and private security companies. It requires a shift in thinking for 
police departments, particularly large metropolitan police departments. The police 
departments’ law enforcement mission was transformed into a tool for public safety. The 
transformation was often awkward, especially in the 1980s and ’90s, when many 
departments saw this transformation as diminishing their authority and opportunity to 
work independently (Community Policing, 2010). By the year 2000, the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance had issued guidelines for partnerships between law enforcement and 
private security organizations. The guidelines were titled “Operation Cooperation.”  
In the guidelines, public law enforcement is defined to include local and 
state police departments, sheriffs’ departments, and federal agencies such as the FBI, 
ATF, Customs Service, Secret Service, Marshals Service, and many others. Private 
security is defined to include corporate security departments, guard companies, alarm 
companies, armored-car businesses, investigative firms, security equipment 
manufacturers, and others (Building Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships to 
Prevent and Response to Terrorism and Public Disorder, 2004, p. 2). Operation 
Cooperation represented a major national initiative to encourage partnerships between 
law enforcement and private security professionals. The driving force behind the 
initiative was a passion among practitioners who saw the potential for great benefit to be 
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gained from public-private teamwork. Before 9/11, the goal to be gained by these 
security companies and the companies they represented was increased security and a 
reduction in crime (Connors et al., 2000, p. 1). The partnership could translate into a 
reduction in losses for the represented companies. 
Seven years had passed since the introduction of the initiative Operation 
Cooperation when a study conducted by Community Oriented Policing Services on 
private security/public policing partnerships suggested that only five to ten percent of law 
enforcement chief executives participate in any collaborative partnerships with private 
security. A further review of the data reveals that in 2000 there were 60 law 
enforcement/private security partnerships. By the year 2007, there were 450 partnerships, 
a 650 percent increase. Such improvements seem impressive until one realizes that there 
are 17,876 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States. Thus, only 2.5 
percent of state and local law enforcement entities have formed a public/private 
partnership (Reaves, 2007, p. 1). Adding the federal agencies into the data, the percentage 
drops even further.  
If law enforcement/private security partnerships are equal to 2.5 percent of 
local and state law enforcement agencies, and these local and state law enforcement 
agencies have the primary responsibility for protecting the critical infrastructure in their 
jurisdiction, of which 85 percent is privately owned, then the question can be raised as to 
who is actually protecting the critical infrastructure in 82.5 percent of these jurisdictions 
since law enforcement does not have the manpower to physically protect these facilities. 
Is it the security officer with limited experience and limited or no training? In addition, 
this security officer would have no access to current intelligence information due to the 
lack of a formal partnership. 
Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the private security field is less well 
known than law enforcement. The last major study to estimate the size of the private 
security field was published in 1985 (Cunning & Taylor, 1985) and updated in 1990 
(Cunning, Strauchs, & Van Meter, 1990). It is difficult to estimate the number of private 
security practitioners in the field today. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that its 
occupational category known as security guards and gaming surveillance officers 
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employed more than 1.1 million persons in 2008. That category likely includes no more 
than half of those employed in private security overall. “Enhancing Private Security 
Officer Surety,” a report for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, found that in the 
five states it studied, guards constituted only one-half to one-third of the total number of 
security employees. The rest are security workers in such fields as alarm installation and 
monitoring, access control, closed-circuit television (CCTV), locks and safes, for 
example, as well as managers of security firms and security departments within larger 
organizations (Consortium, 2009, p. 37). One can infer from this report and a review of 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates for security officers and gaming officers that the 
total number of U.S. security employees could certainly be 2 million or more 
(Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010–2011, p. 6). This is equal to more than twice the 
number of law enforcement officers. The ability to tap this relativity unused resource is a 
great force multiplier. 
3. Conclusion 
The causes of terrorism are beyond the capacity of local law enforcement, and the 
events of 9/11 demonstrated that globalization has changed our security as it has changed 
our economy. The demands being placed on local law enforcement agencies have 
changed as a result of the expanded duties and new and ever-changing homeland security 
concerns. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many police 
agencies redirected police officers from neighborhood patrol to guarding public buildings 
because critical infrastructure protection is largely the responsibility of the local police 
and governments (Geller & Stephens, 2003). This responsibility has become increasingly 
difficult to staff due to decreases in manpower in local police agencies. Although there 
has been a slight increase in sworn officers in state and sheriffs’ departments, the number 
of sworn officers has decreased in 20 of the nation’s 50 largest police departments, 
including six of the seven largest (Reaves, 2007. p. 4). Public/private partnerships could 
help supplement these declines in personnel. 
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Currently no paradigm exists for how to systematically manage a police 
department to respond both to local needs and to unprecedented national requirements 
issued under the Department of Homeland Security. These new demands are 
unpredictable, frequently changing, and unsupported by any long-term commitments of 
funding and training (Babbara et al., 2005, p. 27). In an effort to counter these 
uncertainties and the requirements being placed on local government and law 
enforcement, the proper training of security personnel could help supplement law 
enforcement in the protection and prevention measures being implemented to better 
protect their constituents from a natural or manmade disaster. 
Even if a police department fully understands its future personnel needs and can 
identify adequate numbers of appropriate personnel to fulfill these needs, its ability to 
meet force management objectives is often complicated by budgetary difficulties at the 
local, state, and federal levels. The economic condition of a city can fluctuate, and police 
departments may have to make unplanned cuts, including reducing the authorized number 
of recruit slots. Federal grants are sometimes available to hire new police officers, but 
these grants expire and cities cannot always take on the increased cost for the new 
officers. Such difficulties can constrain the department’s ability to recruit new officers to 
cover the range of local, state, and national missions requested of them (Babbara et al., 
2005, p. 12). 
Major attacks like 9/11 and others have shown that terrorism is no longer purely a 
political and a media phenomenon—it is also an economic one. The potential economic 
impact of terrorism on the private sector offers police an opportunity to engage the 
business community in conversations about not only street crime and neighborhood 
security but also terrorism. The concept of a community must be conceived more broadly 
in this effort of preventing terrorism than in preventing ordinary crime. The 
counterterrorism community includes private-sector infrastructure and multinational 
corporations. Security policymakers must promote partnerships not only with private 
citizens but with business leaders and corporate-security chiefs (Riebling, 2006, p. 4). 
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Collaboration is needed because the dynamics of the threat have changed: the 
threat is purely economic damage through fear, as pointed out in the November 2010 
issue of Inspire magazine. The modus operandi is the dispersal of explosive packages 
dubbed Operation Hemorrhage by Qa’Idah al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula. Intelligence 
analysts conducting further reviews of the November 2010 issue of Inspire concluded 
that with a general but growing concern that operatives in Yemen may again try to send 
package bombs or biological or chemical agents through the mail to Wall Street bankers; 
in February 2011 they issued a threat warning to this effect. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism 
Task Force and NYPD officials have briefed bank executives and their security 
departments on the nature of the threat information (Gordon, 2011, p. 3). An NBC terror 
consultant also pointed to the web writings of al Qaeda blogger Abu Suleiman Al-Nasser, 
who recently wrote, “Rush my Muslim brothers to targeting financial sites and the 
program sites of financial institutions, stock markets and money markets.” Banks like 
Goldman Sachs, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, Barclays, and others have received updated 
security briefings (Dienst, 2011). As a precaution, police are urging Wall Street banks to 
further increase security in and around mail rooms and package delivery. 
Security officers are on the front lines with regard to detecting and possibly 
thwarting a terrorist incident on a facility that they are protecting. If an incident happens 
at their facility, security officers will most certainly be the first on the scene. Tenants or 
personnel assigned to these facilities will be looking for guidance from these security 
officers. Because of this, it is important that security officers receive the proper training 
to enable them to handle these situations professionally and enable them to properly 
assist emergency personnel. 
The effectiveness of critical infrastructure security officers in countering a 
terrorist attack depends on the number of security officers on duty, their qualifications, 
pay, and training (Parfomak, 2004, p. 2). This is true not only for security officers 
protecting critical infrastructure but for security officers in general. 
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In 1993, after a vehicle with an improvised explosive device entered the 
underground parking facility at the World Trade Center and detonated, it took nearly four 
hours in dark, smoky, poorly lit stairwells to evacuate the occupants from those facilities. 
After that attack the Port Authority made improvements to aid in evacuation procedures 
for the complex.  
After the 1993 incident, the trade center’s security officers were given extensive 
training, including a 40-hour course that taught them which floors were blocked by fire 
doors and how to evacuate thousands of tenants/workers in an orderly fashion. Training 
updates and drills continued monthly. Experts say that the security officers at the World 
Trade Center complex became the best trained in the country. And on September 11, 
2001, “that training saved thousands of lives,” says Jeff Schlanger of the risk consulting 
company Kroll, based in New York. Security officers helped guide thousands of 
workers/tenants to safety before the towers fell (Hall, 2003, p. 3). 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, the line between life and death was very 
thin in comparison. Everyone in the north tower on the ninety-second floor died. 
Everyone on the ninety-first floor lived. When a second jet hit the south tower sixteen 
and a half minutes later, the pattern was virtually the same. In each tower, 99 percent of 
the occupants below the crash survived. At the point of impact and above, survival rate 
was limited to just a handful of people in the south tower. 
Most of the dead were in the north tower, the first one hit and the second to 
collapse. Of the 1,434 who died in the north tower, 1,360 were from the crash site and 
above, 72 were below the crash line, and two were undetermined versus 599 in the south 
tower, 595 above the crash site and 4 below the crash line (Craighead, 2003, p. 372). 
(Locations could not be determined for 147 of the building occupants.) The USA Today 
analysis shows that two-thirds of south-tower occupants evacuated the upper floors 
during the sixteen-and-a-half minutes between the attacks. In the north tower, an average 
of 78 people died per floor at the crash area and above, compared with 19 people per 
floor in the south tower. 
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The physical changes that the Port Authority implemented after the 1993 bombing 
included reflective paint on stairs, railings, and stairwell doors, bright arrows to guide 
people along corridors to stairway connections, and the installation of loudspeakers so 
that building managers could talk to people in their offices as well as in hallways. All 
these changes contributed to the successful evacuation of these buildings. The people 
above the impact point of the south tower had sixteen-and-a-half minutes to evacuate to a 
point below the seventy-eighth floor in order to have any chance of survival. The impact 
point in the south tower was between the seventy-eighth and eighty-fourth floors 
(Cauchon, 2001, p. 2). 
The evacuation of the north and south towers on September 11 was also 
considered a success, and nearly everyone who could get out did get out. That success 
was attributed not only to the physical changes that the Port Authority had made but also 
to the revisions to the evacuation plan, which included building evacuation drills and 
additional training for security personnel in these evacuation procedures. Those changes 
saved hundreds, possibly thousands, of lives. The sturdy construction of the buildings 
contributed to the fact that the buildings stood just long enough to give the potential 
survivors a chance to get out using the stairwells that were engineered bigger than the 
building codes required. 
Most important, building management took evacuations seriously. Evacuation 
drills were held every six months, sometimes to the irritation or amusement of occupants. 
Each floor had “fire wardens,” sometimes high-ranking executives of a tenant, and they 
were responsible for organizing an evacuation on their floors. “They had done a great 
job,” says Brian Clark, a fire warden and executive vice president of Euro Brokers, 
located on the eighty-fourth floor of the south tower. “People knew where the stairs 
were” (Cauchon, 2001, p. 2). 
Four hundred seventy-nine rescue workers died making the evacuation a success. 
Among the 479 rescue workers were 343 New York City firefighters, 37 Port Authority 
police officers, and 23 New York City police officers. The sacrifice of New York 
firefighters and police is well known. But 113 others, from low-paid security officers to 
white-collar workers at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the buildings’ 
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owner, stood their ground with firefighters and police during the evacuation of the towers 
and gave their lives in the process (Cauchon, 2001, p. 1). Of the 113 others, six were 
from the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), and 13 were private security 
officers who worked at the World Trade Center complex and a security officer from a 
nearby building (Craighead, 2003, p. 372). 
Protecting people and property from accidents and crime is the principal role of 
security officers. They patrol, monitor, and inspect property to protect against theft, fire, 
vandalism, and other illegal activity (Parfomak, 20204, p. 7). It is important to have 
continuity with regard to security officers who are patrolling and observing and 
protecting their assigned locations daily. The continuity of security officers working the 
same locations on a daily basis enables those officers to recognize individuals who 
belong at a facility and those who do not or who may be just visiting. Through training 
one can enable them to recognize when something just does not look right and to respond 
when things go bad. Making an investment in security officers by improving wages, 
benefits, health insurance, training, and career growth can improve job satisfaction and 
thus possibly limit turnover, thereby contributing to the continuity of the workforce in 
order to help prevent and respond to incidents. 
The Public Advocate of the City of New York, in conjunction with the New York 
City Council, made recommendations based on research findings and New York City 
Council Resolution-569/04. Recommendations were made to the state legislature to adopt 
legislation requiring additional hours of prelicensing instruction in addition to the eight 
hours of mandated training that was required at the time. It was recommended that the 
training curriculum should be revised and strengthened to reflect current security 
concerns, such as terrorism, and that the curriculum be updated regularly to address 
evolving trends. It was also recommended that all private security officers in commercial 
office buildings be required to complete comprehensive New York State–approved 
security officer training programs. SEIU’s Local 32BJ’s 40-hour New York Safe and 
Secure program was recommended to be used as a model. 
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In addition, recommendations were made for the New York Police Department to 
strengthen its coordination with private security units and to unilaterally expand its 
coordination to work with heads of small as well as large security firms. It was 
recommended as part of a new citywide security protocol that the police, fire, and 
emergency response units and other first responders all coordinate their emergency 
response efforts with private security firms. 
New York State did not institute all the recommendations made by the City 
Council and the New York City Public Advocate. However, New York State did make 
available a tax break for building owners who had their security officers participate in a 
40-hour enhanced security training course. 
In two studies conducted in 2004 and 2007, Schmidt came to similar conclusions. 
He found a significant relationship in 2004 and a high correlation in 2007 between job 
training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction among employees. The survey conducted 
in 2004 was a sample of customer and technical service employees in nine different 
organizations in the United States and Canada. The sample size in 2004 was 552, with 
301 responding; this data set was also used in the 2007 study. 
If there is a correlation between satisfaction with workplace training and overall 
job satisfaction, as stated in the previous studies, then we should see a similar outcome in 
a group of security officers who have received additional training and who were surveyed 
currently. The 2004 survey conducted by the New York City Public Advocate Office 
found that the officers were poorly trained and that there was a high turnover rate and low 
wages amongst the officers. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This review examines private security officer preparedness in the following 
subliteratures: 1) government documents (mandates and directives), 2) government 
research, and 3) reports and journals. 
A. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
The Homeland Security act of 2002 provided the basis for the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). This act assigns DHS the responsibility for 
developing a comprehensive national plan for securing CIKR and for recommending the  
measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure 
of the United States in coordination with other agencies of the federal 
government and in cooperation with state and local government agencies 
and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. (Homeland Security 
Act, 2002) 
The national approach for CIKR protection is provided through Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-7. In HSPD-7 the president designates the secretary of 
homeland security as the principal federal official to lead CIKR protection efforts among 
federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector 
(HSPD-7, 2003, p. 1). HSPD-7 establishes a central source for coordinating best practices 
and supporting protective programs across and within government agencies, as well as 
establishing structures to enhance close cooperation between the private sector and 
government at all levels in order to initiate and sustain an effective CIKR protection 
program (Chertoff, 2009, p. 16). HSPD-7 mandated development of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) as the primary vehicle for implementing the CIKR 
protection policy. HSPD-8 establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the 
United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies and is a companion directive to HSPD-5 (HSPD-
8, 2003, p. 1). 
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HSPD-5 required DHS to coordinate efforts to develop and implement the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework 
(NRF) (HSPD-5, 2003, p. 3). NIMS provides a uniform doctrine for command and 
managerial control, including incident command, multiagency coordination, and joint 
information systems to respond to and recover from a domestic incident (Chertoff, 2009, 
p. 74). 
The protection of critical infrastructure has been discussed since September 11, 
2001, and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets defined building human capital as it is related to personnel surety because 
there is a fundamental need to ensure that trustworthy, reliable, and trained personnel are 
available to protect critical infrastructure and key assets from terrorist attack. 
Private sector owners and operators rely on skilled employees to protect 
critical infrastructure. Security personnel and first responders in particular 
require adequate training, equipment, and other support to carry out their 
responsibilities effectively and with some degree of assurance that their 
personal security will not be in jeopardy while accomplishing their 
mission. (National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets, 2003, p. 28) 
In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted. 
Section 6402 of this act was named the Private Security Officer Act of 2004. This section 
authorized a fingerprint-based criminal history check of state and national criminal 
history records to screen prospective and current private security officers (Private 
Security Officer Employment Authorization Act, 2004). This section allowed states to 
opt out of the provisions of this act or to conduct checks under the auspices of Public 
Law 92-544, which gave the states the statutory authority to perform the state and 
national fingerprint checks. The problem with the Private Security Officer Act of 2004 
was that there was no uniformity on the type of background checks being conducted, if 
any at all. Some states conduct state background checks, some federal background 
checks, and some conduct no background checks. Another issue never addressed in the 
act is a requirement for training individuals as required under the National Strategy for 
the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (National Strategy for 
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the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 2003, p. 28). These 
individuals were hired to protect what has been designated as critical infrastructure under 
HSPD-7. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets, along with HSPD-5, 7, and 8 were the precursors to the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 
The federal government addressed the issues of background checks and training 
with regard to federal facilities and security officers hired to protect them in 1995 after 
the Oklahoma City bombing under President Bill Clinton (Reese & Tong, 2010, p. 1). 
The Private Security Officers Act of 2004 did not address these same issues in the same 
way. 
1. Government Research 
The Public Advocate of the City of New York conducted a research study at the 
end of 2004 and reported on the study in February 2005. The study was conducted to 
determine the level of standards at which security officers were performing three years 
after the second attack on the World Trade Center and eleven years after the first attack. 
They determined that the standards were alarmingly low. The standards that were being 
looked at were training and background checks.  
After conducting this research study in 2004, the New York City Public 
Advocate’s Office concluded that, at a time when the Department of Homeland Security 
had kept New York City at a code orange terror alert, the City, businesses, and building 
owners should have had the utmost concern for the public’s security. Many security 
officers who were interviewed reported having much less training than the state requires, 
or none at all, and had little to no background in pertinent areas such as antiterrorism 
protection. Twenty-five percent of officers surveyed had less than a year of experience at 
the building where they worked. The 2005 report was prepared to demonstrate why the 
security officer training standards and enforcement practices of 2004 needed to be 
improved. It was determined that the city’s Class A building owners needed to play a 
more prominent role in developing and maintaining a professional security force because 
neither city leaders or private building owners had taken the initiative to train security 
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officers to respond to terrorism incidents, whether an attack or an individual conducting 
reconnaissance at the location. The security officers were not instructed on how to 
interface with police officers or work with firefighters during an emergency (Sheppard & 
Mintz-Roth, 2005, p. 1). 
The New York City Public Advocates Office and the City Council were 
concerned because the area of Lower Manhattan, which has been the site of previous 
terrorist attacks (the 1993 bombing of and the 2001 aircraft attack on the World Trade 
Center), contains the headquarters of eleven Fortune 500 companies, the stock exchange, 
the financial district, and many high gross revenue, high employee count firms that are 
located in Class A buildings. Financial transactions of more than $1 trillion are executed 
by firms and companies in this area daily. Clearly, this region fulfills all the target 
requirements of Al Qaeda and its followers—the United States economy (J. Miller, 
2007). 
In conducting this literature review, I found very few research reports pertaining 
to security officer training, although many reports state that security officers require 
training. The NYC Public Advocates Office prepared its report to demonstrate the need 
of current security officer training standards and enforcement practices for improvement. 
It compared New York City’s security standards to other large domestic and international 
cities and explained why New York City’s Class A building owners needed to play a 
more prominent role in developing and maintaining a professional security force. The 
Public Advocates Office made recommendations, and some of those recommendations 
have been enacted, such as the New York State Enhanced Security Guard Training 
Program. Further research can now be conducted to determine whether those 
recommendations were effective. 
The Public Advocates Office recommended that all private security officers in 
commercial office buildings be required to complete comprehensive New York State–
approved security officer training programs and suggested Local 32BJ’s Thomas 
Shortman Training Fund 40-hour New York Safe and Secure program as a recommended 
example. The 40-hour training course includes state-of-the-art segments on terrorism, 
evacuation procedures, and coordination with police, fire, and emergency personnel 
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during an emergency. The 40-hour Thomas Shortman Security Officer Training course 
eventually became the model for the New York State Enhanced Security Guard Training 
Program. The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program was implemented to support 
and complement the existing security officer training and counterterrorism efforts in New 
York State. The program does this by providing training and education designed to 
improve observation, detection, and reporting skills and improve coordination with local 
police, fire, and emergency services. In addition, the program provides and improves 
skills in working with advanced security technology, including surveillance and access 
control procedures. The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program and its precursor, 
the Thomas Shortman Security Officer Training course, both require forty hours of 
training, with a minimum of three hours devoted to terrorism awareness.  
New York State believes that because 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in 
the United States belongs to private enterprise and corporations, those security officers 
are literally one of the nation’s first groups of defenders and play an integral role in 
prevention and deterrence efforts. They also believe that success in prevention and 
deterrence of both general crime and terrorist acts begins with the establishment of a 
baseline and the maintenance of a robust all-hazards and all-crimes management 
infrastructure. The professional security officer industry in New York State, with an 
excess of 140,000 certified security officers, constitutes that baseline. 
New York State established the Enhanced Security Guard Training Program to 
provide security officers with the basic awareness of terrorism issues that can potentially 
affect responsibilities within the purview of their employment. The program was 
designed to improve observation, detection, and reporting capabilities while enhancing 
coordination capability with other emergency-response professionals. In addition, this 
program was designed to elaborate on previously provided instruction, thereby elevating 
participants’ familiarity with access control issues and security technology. 
The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program provides instruction in the 
following topical areas: Information and Intelligence Sharing; Terrorism Indicators and 
Trends; WMD Standardized Awareness Training; Anti-Surveillance Strategies; 
Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessments; Safety and Security—
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Emergency Planning; National Incident Management (NIMS) training to include, IS-700 
National Incident Management System—An Introduction; and ICS-100 Introduction to 
Incident Command System (ICS); the Fundamentals of Patrol; Criminal and Civil Law—
Powers and Limitations; Cooperation and Coordination in Public Relations; and Basic 
First Aid (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 4). 
The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program is intended to support and 
complement the current security officer training and counterterrorism efforts in the State 
of New York. Through this program security officers will gain an increased level of 
training and knowledge pertaining to security concerns and terrorism-related issues in 
support of their role as security specialists and their responsibilities within the purview of 
their profession. 
The New York State Office of Homeland Security Enhanced Security Guard 
Training Program is an extension of previously provided training as governed by New 
York State law. Therefore, security guards participating in this course of instruction must 
have satisfactorily completed all necessary training requirements (Enhanced Security 
Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 14). 
This program of instruction is consistent with and in recognition of HSPD-8, 
which calls for a National Preparedness Goal that establishes measurable priorities, 
targets, and a common approach to developing needed capabilities. The goal utilizes a 
capabilities-based planning approach to help answer the questions “How prepared are 
we?”, “How prepared do we need to be?”, and “How do we prioritize efforts to help close 
the gap?” A central objective of capabilities-based planning is the identification of target 
level of capability that federal, state, local, and tribal entities must achieve to perform 
critical tasks for homeland security missions. Capabilities are combinations of resources 
that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from performance of 
one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and performance standards. Version 
1.0 of the Target Capabilities List (TCL) identifies 36 target capabilities (HSPD-8, 2003). 
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Additionally, the program recognizes and is consistent with the Universal Task 
List (UTL), which “defines what tasks need to be performed by Federal, State, local, and 
tribal jurisdictions and the private sector to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from events defined in the National Planning Scenarios” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2007). 
In addition to compliance with the guidance obtained from HSPD-8, the 
Enhanced Security Guard Training program was developed in accordance with 
compliance standards of HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, so as to ensure 
standardization and conformity with nationally accepted practices and the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) (Enhanced Security Guard Training program, 
2006, pp. 5, 6). 
As an incentive for building owners, New York State provided a tax benefit to 
building owners who enabled their security officers to attend the enhanced training. 
Under the Enhanced Security Guard Tax Credit Program, certain qualified building 
owners who own buildings 500,000 square feet or more that are protected by qualified 
and trained security officers may claim a credit against the tax imposed by article 9-A of 
the New York State tax law. The amount of credit allowed is $3,000 for each qualified 
security officer who is employed for a full year and has received the Office of Homeland 
Security Enhanced Security Guard Training.  
The incentive for the security officers upon completion of the training is an 
increase in their hourly wages. In an effort to help reduce turnover, New York State 
required that the officer who completed the enhanced training was required to remain 
employed with the sponsoring employer for one year. 
2. Reports and Journals 
The literature review in this section encompasses a number of reports and studies 
relating to the benefits of job training. Some of the literature is new, while some of it, 
from the early 1980s, is somewhat dated. Training, as defined in one report, is the process 
of learning, as well as the application of acquired knowledge aiming at better 
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performance of employees. It is training and development programs that bring change in 
terms of attitudes, knowledge, and behavior of employees (Siddiqui, 2009, p. 1). There is 
a consistent correlation across the literature between job training satisfaction and overall 
job satisfaction among employees.  
Training can also help to improve job satisfaction, as found in two studies from 
2004 (Schmidt, 2004) and 2007 (Schmidt, 2007). Schmidt found a significant relationship 
in 2004 and a high correlation in 2007 between job training satisfaction and overall job 
satisfaction among employees in customer contact positions. Schmidt found that the 
results of his studies concurred with prior studies conducted for professional occupations 
(Ellinger, Ellinger, & Keller, 2003; Tansky & Cohen, 2001). These reports suggest that 
there is a correlation between the finding in this report and the two prior studies, 
suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job 
satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmidt, 
2007, p. 492). 
This is significant considering that part of the recommendations made by the New 
York City Public Advocates Office was the need for improved training for New York 
City security officers. At the time of that study, a high turnover rate among the security 
officers surveyed was noted. It would be interesting to see whether the improved training 
had any effect on the turnover rate of security officers. 
Hypothesis #5: As the level of job satisfaction decreases the level of employee 
turn-over increases. 
Training is a process of learning, as well as the application of acquired knowledge 
aimed at improving employee development. Training is defined as a learning process that 
involves the acquisition of knowledge, sharpening of skills, concepts, rules, or changing 
of attitudes and behaviors to enhance the performance of employees. Training is about 
the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) through professional 
development. It is the training and development programs that bring about the change in 
terms of knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of employees. As a result of these programs,  
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the employees are not only well acquainted with what is expected of them and how they 
need to enhance their skills and competencies, but they also achieve overall 
organizational development (Siddiqui, 2009, p. 1). 
B. THE ROLE OF TRAINING 
What are KSAs? 
The below definitions are defined by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management: 
KSAs—Knowledge, Skill, Ability 
Specific KSAs are needed in performing certain jobs. Individual KSAs are 
demonstrated through qualifying experience, education, or training.  
KSAs are further defined: 
Knowledge: A body of information applied directly to the performance of a 
function, usually factual or procedural in nature. An example is knowledge of 
emergency/evacuation procedures for a building to effectively respond during an 
emergency. 
Skill: An observable competence to perform a learned psychomotor act, the 
proficient manual, verbal, or mental manipulation of data or things. An example is having 
the skill to operate personal computers.  
Ability: The competence to perform an observable behavior or a behavior that 
results in an observable product; it is the power or capacity to perform an activity or task. 
An example is the ability to use a variety of scanning instruments at different check 
points while performing perimeter security for a facility (United States Office of 
Personnel Management, 2011). 
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Figure 4.   The Role of Training (From Introduction of Training, 2011, p. 1.) 
Besides knowledge, skills, and ability needed in performing certain jobs, there is a 
process by which individuals make decisions about their own behavior in an 
organizational setting. This process of decision making about one’s own behavior has 
three concepts that serve as building blocks for the theory of expectancy. The first 
concept to be discussed is the performance outcome expectancy concept. In an 
individual’s mind every behavior has associated with it certain outcomes, whether they 
are rewards or punishments. An individual may believe that if they increase productivity 
they will receive a bonus, or an individual may believe that certain levels of performance 
may lead to disapproval or approval from fellow workers or supervisors. Each 
performance can be seen as leading to a number of different kinds of outcomes and 
outcomes can differ in types. 
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Figure 5.   Basic Motivation-Behavior Sequence (From Leavitt,  
Pondy, & Boje, 1989, p. 7.) 
Valence (value, worth, attractiveness to a specific individual) is another concept 
in the expectancy theory. Each outcome has a different valence for each individual 
because it is based on an individual’s perceptions and needs, which are different because 
they in turn reflect other factors in the individual’s life. A pension plan may have great 
valence for an older worker but little valence for a young employee on his first job. Some 
individuals may value a chance for promotion while others may not. 
The third concept of the expectancy theory is the effort-performance expectancy. 
This expectancy represents the individual’s perception of achieving such behavior and 
the probability that they will succeed. 
Nadler and Lawler have stated that by putting these three concepts together, it is 
possible to make a basic statement about motivation. To attempt to behave in a certain 
way is greatest when the individual believes that the behavior will lead to outcomes 
(performance-outcomes expectancy), the individual believes that the outcomes have 
positive value for them (valence), and the individual believes that they are able to 
perform at the desired level (effort-performance expectancy). An individual given a 
number of alternative levels of behavior will choose that level of performance that has the 
greatest motivational force associated with it (Leavitt, Pondy, & Boje, 1989, p. 6). More 
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than 50 studies have been undertaken to test the validity of the expectancy theory 
approach for predicting employee behavior, most of which support the validity of this 
theory (Mitchell, 1974). 
A trained and skilled employee is far better than one who is untrained and 
unskilled. The employee becomes more competent and has the potential to perform his 
assigned tasks independently. Employees who are trained need less supervision than 
those who are not—a major benefit of training and development programs. A trainee 
acquires new knowledge, skills, and attitudes and applies them in job situations. Training 
is a way to create confidence among employees so that they can operate and complete 
their tasks effectively and efficiently (Siddiqui, 2009, p. 2). 
A number of studies have been conducted on the correlation between job 
satisfaction and employee turnover rates, training and organization commitment, and 
compensation, work motivation and job satisfaction, and the field of study has ranged 
from health care workers, small businesses to large organizations, and fast-food 
franchises. The studies were conducted in England, France, Greece, and the United 
States. Some of the studies found that the results concurred with prior studies conducted 
on professional occupations (Ellinger, Ellinger, & Keller, 2003; Tansky & Cohen, 2001), 
suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job 
satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmid, 
2007, p. 492). 
In a study conducted in 2000 by Eagan, Lashley, and Thomas on the benefits of 
training in leisure retailing (a case study of McDonald’s restaurants in the United 
Kingdom), alternative measures other than the somewhat narrow financial indices 
employed in earlier attempts were used to show potential returns on investment in 
training. The model argues that training shapes individual behavior, which in turn results 
in benefits that include improved productivity, employee satisfaction, reduced staff 
turnover, improved service quality, increased customer satisfaction, reduced waste, and 
fewer accidents, as well as improved employee flexibility and willingness to accept 
strategic and organizational change. In these circumstances training played a key role in 
leisure retail organizations aiming to gain competitive advantage through service quality 
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and employee performance. The purpose of the study was to examine the extent to which 
the anticipated benefits of training materialized in practice. The authors applied the 
benefits model to 12 case study restaurants in the Midland region of the United Kingdom 
and found evidence to suggest that low levels of training gave rise to high levels of staff 
turnover and that providing good training has a positive effect on staff retention (Eaglen, 
Lashley, & Thomas, 2000, p. 334). 
If there is a correlation between satisfaction with workplace training and overall 
job satisfaction, as stated in the previous studies mentioned, then we should see a similar 
outcome for a group of security officers who have received additional training  in  loss 
prevention and customer service/relations, terrorism awareness/prevention, or emergency 
response to incidents if they were surveyed now. 
Hypothesis #3: The completion of additional training in loss prevention and 
customer service/relations, terrorism awareness/prevention, or emergency response to 
incidents increases the level of job satisfaction. 
In an attempt to find the relationship between workplace learning and job 
satisfaction in small to midsize businesses, Robert Rowden conducted a study in 2002 of 
twelve small to midsize companies that agreed to participate in the study. These 
companies were located through a variety of methods, including personnel contacts, 
colleagues, and cold calling. No criteria for selection was used other than size (fewer than 
200 workers). This study established strong links between workplace learning and job 
satisfaction in these small to midsize businesses. Previous to this study it was the 
conventional wisdom that small to midsize businesses do little to develop the human 
resources in their organizations. This study does not support that thinking. The 
respondents in this study reported extensive incidents of formal, informal, and incidental 
learning in the workplace, with incidental learning having the greater place among them. 
In addition, the respondents also reported a feeling of overall job satisfaction, with 
recognition, work enjoyment, supportive work environment, and benefits as a big part of 
their perception of satisfaction. The study also found that job satisfaction can be 
attributed in large part to the availability of learning opportunities on the job (Rowden,  
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2002, p. 423). Increased competition, globalization, and speed of change have helped 
highlight the importance of the capacity for learning in small to midsize businesses as a 
key to both survival and success (Dunphy, Turner, & Crawford, 2997). 
Bartlett conducted a study in 2001 study in the health care field on the 
relationship between training and organizational commitment; it examined the 
relationship between employee attitudes toward training and feelings of organizational 
commitment among a sample of 337 registered nurses from five hospitals. Using social-
exchange theory as a framework for his investigation, Bartlett found that perceived 
access to training, social support for training, motivation to learn, and the perceived 
benefits of training are positively related to organizational commitment. Using a three-
component model of organizational commitment, Bartlett found that the strongest 
relationships appear with the affective form of commitment. The relationship between 
perceived access to training opportunities and the affective form of organizational 
commitment is moderated by job satisfaction but not job involvement, and training and 
development contribute to desired workplace attitudes, including organizational 
commitment, which may in turn influence behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover 
rates (Bartlett, 2001, p. 335). Regardless of whether increased commitment is an 
objective of training activities, organizational commitment was acknowledged as an 
influence on the training process.  
Howard reviewed Bartlett’s work in an invited reaction and found that the Bartlett 
article is framed in terms of demonstrating the use of organizational commitment as an 
alternative training outcome to help justify the investment that organizations make in 
training and development. In his conclusion Howard did not agree with Bartlett’s 
recommendation that Human Resource Division (HRD) practitioners use organizational 
commitment and other work-related attitudes regularly as outcome measures; however he 
did agree with most of the other implications that Bartlett discussed (Howard, 2001, p. 
359). 
The study “Commitment In The Workplace: Theory Research And Application,” 
conducted by Meyer and Allen in 1997, demonstrates ways in which the positive effects 
of training on organizational commitment can be enhanced (Meyer & Allen, 1997, p. 75). 
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The results of a 2009 study of Malaysian public service managers also suggests that 
organizational learning plays an important role and significantly contributes to 
organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and work outcomes (Rose, Kumar, & Pak, 
2009, p. 61). 
In another study that applied the theoretical framework based on expectancy and 
discrepancy theories to examine how the elements of total compensation might influence 
work motivation and job satisfaction, the relationship between the elements of total 
compensation, work motivation, and job satisfaction were analyzed. Proposals were 
developed to predict the conditions of compensation efficiency on work motivation and 
job satisfaction in the cultural context of employment in France. Two samples of 
employees, 269 exempt (not paid for overtime) and 297 nonexempt (paid for overtime), 
were studied separately.  
The three principle conclusions of the study were that: 
Under certain conditions, individualized compensation of exempt employees can 
be a factor of work motivation; 
Flexible pay of nonexempt employees neither motivates nor increases job 
satisfaction; 
Benefits of exempt and non-exempt employees neither motivate nor increase job 
satisfaction (Igalens & Roussel, 1999, p. 1016). 
A survey conducted in 2004 by the New York City Public Advocate Office 
reported that the officers were poorly trained and that there was a high turnover rate due 
to low wages and limited benefits and health care among the officers. To test this theory 
that high turnover is related to job satisfaction, another question that can be asked is 
whether providing benefits and health insurance to employees increases their level of job 
satisfaction and whether, as the level of job satisfaction decreases, the level of employee 
turnover increases. Another hypotheses to be tested is whether, as the level of 
compensation increases, the level of job satisfaction also increases. An additional aspect 
to explore is, when increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of  
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loss prevention and customer service/relations training, terrorism awareness/prevention 
training, or emergency response to incidents, whether that training increases the level of 
training participation. 
A 2007 study by Sahinidis and Bouris of 134 employees and lower managers of 
five large Greek organizations—after they had completed a training program in an effort 
to measure the employees’ perceived training effectiveness in relationship to employee 
attitudes—found a strong relationship between employee perceived training effectiveness 
and motivation, job satisfaction, and commitment. This study also found that, although 
there was no causal relationship found, the magnitude of the correlations indicates that 
the concepts examined are inextricably related and the relationships ought to be taken 
seriously by practicing managers, as well as academics (Sahinidis & Bouris, 2008, p. 74). 
A meta-analytic review of 106 articles and book chapters on participation was 
conducted. However, many of these materials were found not to be appropriate for meta-
analysis. From the process of literature search and elimination, the reviewers found 47 
studies that contained quantifiable estimates of the relationship between participation in 
decision making and satisfaction or productivity. Of these, nine studies were 
experimental or quasi-experimental studies with subjects who were not organizational 
members, 13 were field experiments in which participation was manipulated in an 
organization, and the rest were correlational. This research was found to support some 
current wisdom about the effects of participation (Miller & Monge, 1986, p. 748). The 
meta-analysis provides some support for the conclusions reached by (Locke & 
Schweiger, 1979) that participation has an effect on both satisfaction and productivity 
and that its effect on satisfaction is somewhat stronger than its effect on productivity. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In summation, most of the literature from 2003 to 2007 seems slightly dated, 
following which the frequency of reporting tends to drop off. A review of the government 
documents reveals a rush after 2001 to prepare strategies for guidance in the protection of 
critical infrastructure. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical  
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Infrastructure and Key Assets was followed by HSPD-5, HSPD-7, and HSPD-8, prepared 
in 2003. These four components, along with a few others, were the basis for the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan prepared in 2009.  
These strategies and directives speak about training with regard to critical 
infrastructure protection, but there is very little evidence that this type of training is being 
conducted at the security officer level, even though those individuals are on the front 
lines with regard to protecting critical infrastructure. For example, HSPD-5 required DHS 
to coordinate efforts to develop and implement the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) a key feature of which is the Incident Command System (ICS). Very 
little research appears to exist regarding the training of individuals beyond first 
responders in the NIMS system and the Incident Command System. 
There seems to be a disconnect in the literature between the standards imposed for 
security officers employed to protect federal facilities, as opposed to security officer 
standards in general. 
The 2004 study of the Public Advocate of the City of New York made 
recommendations, some of which were implemented. Further research at this time could 
determine whether those recommendations were effective. This study also noted that 
there was a high turnover rate among security officers surveyed.  
The Sasha Corporation reviewed a compilation of 15 studies on the cost to replace 
an $8.00-per-hour employee in the United States. Per these studies the cost ranges from 
$3,500 on the low end of the survey to as much as $25,000 on the high end, when 
additional costs are factored in, such as loss of productivity, advertising, temporary staff, 
recruitment, and training. On average the cost of replacing an $8.00-an-hour employee 
over the 15 surveys was $9,444.47; averaging the surveys using only the lowest 10 of the 
15 surveys gives an estimated cost of $5,505.80 (Compilation of Turnover Costs Studies, 
2009, p. 2). This can represent a significant cost to a company, considering that some 
estimates for security officer turnover range from 100 percent to as high as 300 to 400 
percent annually for smaller firms (SEIU, 2010, p. 1) and that in general the compilation  
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of studies reviewed by the SASHA Corporation on the cost of employee turnover are 
correlated to salary of the employee; therefore, as the cost per hour for the employee 
increases, so does the cost to replace that employee.  
The cost of employee turnover has a cumulative effect on a company: even with 
the reduction of one worker, a company’s productivity starts to slip. The current staff is 
required to work additional hours to cover the vacancies, which starts to affect morale. 
The time it takes to find a replacement, screen and interview the applicants, and then train 
them for the position is not cost beneficial to a company. It might be worthwhile to invest 
in one’s workforce if that investment increases motivation, job satisfaction, and 
productivity, and thus has the potential to reduce the turnover rate of employees. The cost 
of such an investment should be weighed against the cost of employee turnover. 
Prior studies have indicated that there is a correlation between job training 
satisfaction and overall job satisfaction. One of the recommendations made by the Public 
Advocates Office was the need for increased training for security personnel. An 
interesting question is whether the improved training has any effect on the employment 
and job satisfaction rate of security officers. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
This study is being conducted on the occupation of security officer in order to 
increase the current field of research in this area and because of the increased 
responsibilities being placed on security officers since September 11. A number of 
measures and recommendations with regard to training and preparedness of security 
officers were made for implementation in 2005 by the New York City Council and the 
New York City Public Advocates Office, which found that security officers were 
undertrained, underpaid, and unprepared to protect the constituents of New York City. 
The report found that the security officers were not trained to respond to terrorism, 
interface with police, or work with firefighters during an emergency. The Public 
Advocates Office and the City Council also found a high turnover rate among security 
officers in New York City to which low wages and lack of opportunities contributed. 
This survey research will be used to better understand factors influencing job 
satisfaction and employee turnover rates, in particular how various levels of training and 
compensation and the provision of heath care benefits influence security officer job 
satisfaction. Survey research was selected to better understand the perceptions of a 
random sample of security personnel and to understand the factors influencing job 
satisfaction and turnover. The 26-item survey instrument that was developed was 
submitted for review by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) local 32bj 
and the Thomas Shortman Training Program, the training program for SEIU. The purpose 
of having SEIU 32bj and the Thomas Shortman Training Program review the survey 
instrument was to make sure that it accurately reflected security officers’ duties and 
responsibilities. SEIU local 32bj represents the security guards during contract 
negotiations and provides training and benefits to its constituents. SEIU 32bj and the 
Thomas Shortman Training Program reviewed the survey instrument, made 
recommendations, and approved the survey instrument for distribution to its members. 
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A. SAMPLE 
A random selection (sample population) of 401 security guards was taken from a 
larger population of security officers assumed to contain high levels of variance in terms 
of the level of training received. Random selection was used to mitigate potential 
selection biases that might result from purposeful or convenience sampling and that 
might create issues related to internal validity. Random sampling was also selected to 
ensure that participants would remain anonymous. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
A 26-item survey instrument was administered to the sample population during 
their in-service training at Union local 32bj. The instructors who provide the in-service 
training distributed and collected the returned surveys to help maintain the anonymity of 
the respondents. A majority of the 26-item survey questions was based on the Likert 
five-point scales; some of the questions are response questions. A complete list of 
questions is available in Appendix B. 
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
All useable surveys were parsed into two groups, those who have received the 40-
hour Enhanced Security Officer training and those who have not. Both descriptive 
statistics were used to better understand variance within the sample population; t-tests 
were used to better understand how the group that had received training compared with 
the group that had not received training, and regression analysis was used to explore 
possible correlations among the factors influencing job satisfaction and security guard 
turnover and the following hypotheses: 
H1—Providing health insurance to employees increases the level of job 
satisfaction.  
H2—As the level of compensation increases, the level of job satisfaction also 
increases.  
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H3—The completion of additional training in loss prevention and customer 
service/relations, terrorism awareness/prevention, or emergency response to incidents 
increases the level of job satisfaction. 
H4—When increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of 
loss prevention and customer service/relations training, terrorism awareness/prevention 
training, or emergency response to incidents, training increases the level of training 
participation. 
H5—As the level of job satisfaction decreases, the level of employee turnover 
increases. 
 
Figure 6.   Thesis Research, Hypotheses 
 46
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 47
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Before comparing two groups using independent t-tests and exploring bivariate 
analysis among the variables under study, the author used Cronbach’s Alpha to better 
understand whether the survey items measuring a particular construct such as job 
satisfaction move together or are measuring the same thing. Based on the value of the 
Alpha, the author was able to generate composite variables for job Satisfaction and 
compensation/benefits. The author also identified another variable: training efficacy. 
Below are the results. 
A. JOB SATISFACTION 
In terms of job satisfaction, the author used Cronbach’s Alpha against all five 
survey items and obtained an Alpha value of .750, which suggests that all five items 
move together and are measuring the same thing. 
Note: A Cronbach’s Alpha value of .70 or higher is considered adequate for social 
science research. This particular statistic does not tell us whether these five questions are 
only measuring job satisfaction, only that all five items move together and are measuring 
the same thing. 
Table 1.   Cronbach’s Alpha Job Satisfaction 
Reliability 
Statistics
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items 
.750 5 
Based on the results of this test, the author calculated a composite variable, “Job 




Wages had a mean value of 4.26 and did not move with other compensation 
variables. 
Table 2.   Descriptive Statistics for Wages 
Descriptive Statistics
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Compensation1_Wages 341 1.00 5.00 4.2698 .97193 
Valid N (list wise) 341     
In terms of “Compensation Raises, Compensation Benefits, and Compensation 
Heath Insurance,” the author used Cronbach’s Alpha against all three survey items and 
obtained an Alpha value of .774, which suggests that all three items move together and 
are measuring the same thing. 
Table 3.   Cronbach’s Alpha Compensation Raises, Benefits, and Health Insurance 
Reliability 
Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.774 3 
Based on the results of this test, the author calculated a composite variable 
“Compensation Benefits Composite” by calculating the mean across all three survey 
items. 
 C. EMPLOYEE TURNOVER 
Using a perceived measure of employee turnover is not ideal, but without actual 
numbers,  the author decided to work with perceived turnover and qualify each statement 
that references this variable. Cronbach’s Alpha was used to determine whether the two 
survey items measuring turnover move together. An Alpha score of .607 indicated that 
the two items do not move together and are not measuring the same thing. 
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Table 4.   Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Turnover 
Reliability 
Statistics
Cronbach’s Alpha N of Items 
.607 2 
Since the item measuring “Employee Turnover Percent” used a seven-point scale, 
it was dropped from the analysis, and the item “Employee Turnover Ratio” was retained 
for the analysis. 
D. TRAINING EFFICACY  
One item was used to measure the efficacy of training among private security 
guards: "This amount of training is sufficient to prepare you to meet your security guard 
responsibilities?” 
1. Comparing Two Groups (Independent t-test) 40-Hour Training 
Before comparing the group that participated in the 40-hour training program with 
the one that did not participate in the program, all scales were converted from ordinal to 
interval measures to facilitate using the independent samples t-test. All surveys that 
included neutral values (3) were omitted, all values 1 and 2 were collapsed to 0, and all 
values 4 and 5 were collapsed to 1. Collapsing the scale reduced the number of usable 
surveys to 181. After collapsing the scales, an independent sample t-test was run. While 
there was a difference in the means between groups (40-hours enhanced training versus 
no 40-hours enhanced training) for “Job Satisfaction” and “Compensation/Benefits,” 
Leven’s test for equality of variance among groups was above .05 for all items, and all 
significance measures exceeded .05. This suggests that the independent t-test statistic 
does support reporting difference between groups. 
 50












Employee Turnover2_Rate  no 84 .5833 .49597 .05411 
yes 97 .5876 .49482 .05024 
Training: Sufficient to prepare you 
to meet your responsibilities 
no 84 .7500 .43561 .04753 
yes 97 .7423 .43966 .04464 
Job Satisfaction Composite no 84 .8929 1.40582 .15339 
yes 97 .6619 .68821 .06988 
Compensation Benefits Composite no 84 .8095 1.45000 .15821 
yes 97 .4639 .54125 .05496 
2. Bivariate Analysis 
A set of bivariate tests (correlations) were run on the following survey items: 
“Employee Turnover Rate,” “Training Efficacy,” “Job Satisfaction,” and 
“Compensation/Benefits.” 
The correlation between “Compensation/Benefits” and “Job Satisfaction” is 
significant at the .01 level and suggests that “Compensation/Benefits” explains 39 percent 
of the variance in “Job Satisfaction.” 
The correlation between “Training Efficacy” and “Job Satisfaction” is significant 
at the .01 level and suggests that “Training Efficacy” explains 17 percent of the variation 
in “Job Satisfaction.” 
The correlation between “Training Efficacy” and “Compensation/Benefits” is 
significant at the .01 level and suggests that perceived level of training efficacy explains 
11 percent of the variation in the perceived value of “Compensation/Benefits.” 
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Table 6.   Independent Samples Test 





Equality t-test for Equality of Means 
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A set of bivariate tests (correlations) were run on the survey items measuring “Job 
Satisfaction” to better understand how much of each “Job Satisfaction” item is being 
explained by all another “Job Satisfaction” items. After running all pairs, it appears that 
the item “Necessary Instruction to do a Good Job” explains .512 or approximately 50 
percent of variation in “Proud to be an Employee Here,” and  “Communications from 
Top Management” explains .514 or approximately 50 percent of “Necessary Instructions 
to do a Good Job.” 
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Table 7.   Correlations: Compensation/Benefits and Job Satisfaction, Training 





















1 .042 -.047 -.036 
Sig. (2-
tailed)   
.440 .383 .508 
N 341 341 341 341 
Training; 
Sufficient to 





.042 1 .175** .118* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.440   .001 .030 





-.047 .175** 1 .393** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.383 .001   .000 






-.036 .118* .393** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.508 .030 .000   
N 341 341 341 341 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
3. Correlations  
The first significant correlation between “Instruction to do a Good Job” and 
“Proud to be an Employee Here” suggests that “Instruction to do a Good Job” explains 42 
percent of “Proud to be an Employee Here.” If we interpret “Instruction to do a Good 
Job” as those who received training, then the data suggest that training is an important 
factor influencing “Proud to be an Employee Here.” Since “Proud to be an Employee 
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Here” holds together with the other items measuring “Job Satisfaction” (Alpha .750), this 
suggests that training has a significant influence on “Job Satisfaction.” Taking the next 
step, we would like to see a strong correlation between “Job Satisfaction” and “Employee 
Turnover Rate.” Since the relationship between “Employee Satisfaction” (all five items) 
and “Employee Turnover” was not supported by the data collected in this study, the data 
that was collected represented perceived measures of employee turnover versus actual 
measures of employee turnover. Based on the limitations associated with measuring 
perceived employee turnover, prior studies identified in the literature are used to support 
the relationship. 
There have been a number of studies conducted on the correlation between job 
satisfaction and employee turnover rates, training and organization, commitment and 
compensation, work motivation and job satisfaction. The field of study has ranged from 
health care workers, small business to large organizations, and fast-food franchises. The 
studies were conducted in England, France, Greece, and the United States. Some of the 
studies found that the results concurred with prior studies conducted on professional 
occupations (Ellinger, Ellinger, & Keller, 2003; Tansky & Cohen, 2001), suggesting that 
the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for 
employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmidt, 2007, p. 492). The 
relationship between perceived access to training opportunities and the effective form of 
organizational commitment is moderated by job satisfaction but not job involvement, and 
training and development contribute to desired workplace attitudes, including 
organizational commitment, which may in turn influence behaviors such as absenteeism 
and turnover rates (Bartlett, 2001, p. 335). 
In a study conducted in 2000 by Eagan, Lashley, and Thomas on the benefits of 
training in leisure retailing (a case study of McDonald’s restaurants in the United 
Kingdom), the authors used alternative measures other than the somewhat narrow 
financial indices employed in earlier attempts to show potential returns on investment in 
training. The model argues that training shapes individual behavior, which in turn results 
in benefits that include improved productivity, employee satisfaction, reduced staff 
turnover, improved service quality, increased customer satisfaction, reduced waste, and 
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fewer accidents, as well as improved employee flexibility and a willingness to accept 
strategic and organizational change. In these circumstances training plays a key role in 
leisure retail organizations who are aiming to gain competitive advantage through service 
quality and employee performance. The purpose of the study was to examine the extent 
to which the anticipated benefits of training materialized in practice. The authors applied 
the benefits model to 12 case study restaurants in the Midland region of the United 
Kingdom and found evidence to suggest that low levels of training give rise to high levels 
of staff turnover and that the provision of good training has a positive effect on staff 
retention (Eaglen, Lashley, & Thomas, 2000, p. 334). 
The second significant correlation between “Communications from Top 
Management” and “Necessary Instruction to Do a Good Job” suggests that 
“Communications from Management” explains 49 percent of “Instructions to do a Good 
Job.” This may be interpreted as management effectiveness in communicating training 
goals for a particular job or position. This also supports the idea that training may be 
perceived by management and employees as closely related to a job or position, rather 
than a particular set of program goals or a program brand. This particular interpretation 
requires further investigation. 
The third significant correlation between “Use of Skills” and “Proud to be an 
Employee Here” (significant at the .01 level) suggests that “Use of Skills—possibly from 
training” influences 45 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction.” 
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Table 8.   Correlations: Job Satisfaction 
 Correlations 
  Job Satisfaction
1: Good use 


























Job Satisfaction 1: 
Good use of my 




1 .453** .188** .290** .355**
Sig. (2-
tailed)  
.000 .000 .000 .000
N 341 341 341 341 341
Job Satisfaction 2: 





.453** 1 .327** .418** .427**
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000
N 341 341 341 341 341








.188** .327** 1 .380** .450**
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000
N 341 341 341 341 341
Job Satisfaction 4: 
Necessary 





.290** .418** .380** 1 .494**
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000  .000
N 341 341 341 341 341
Job Satisfaction 5: 
Communications 






.355** .427** .450** .494** 1
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000  
N 341 341 341 341 341
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Summary of Findings 
Security officers’ wages have improved since 2004 although 53.4 percent of the 
respondents are still not satisfied with their wages, even though 54 percent of the 
respondents reported making more than $16 an hour, more than the national average. 
1. Compensation/Benefits 
The range for compensation of wages available on the survey instrument ranged 
from under $10 an hour to more than $16 an hour. Fifty-four percent or 184 respondents 
reported making more than $16 an hour. Ninety-three respondents (27.2 percent) reported 
making between $14 and 16 an hour. 
A review of the statistics reveals that 81.2 percent of the security officers 
surveyed reported earning $14 or more an hour, with 54 percent reporting that they make 
more than $16 an hour, equivalent to more than $33,280 a year. The national annual 
median wage for a security officer/guard in 2008 was $23,820 (Occupational 
Employment and Wages: Security Guards, 2009, p. 1). The majority of the officers 
surveyed reported making more than the national median wage; some reported making 
close to $20 an hour. Some of the differences can be attributed to location and the higher 
cost of living in the surveyed area (New York City and metro area). 
A review of the 341 respondents’ answers revealed that when security officers 
were asked whether they were satisfied with these wages, 27 percent or 92 respondents 
were satisfied with their current wages; 53.4 percent or 182 respondents were not 
satisfied with their current wages. 
The security officers were asked whether benefits (sick days, holidays, and 
vacation days) offered are fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers in 




were fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers in the area. One hundred 
eight officers (31.7 percent) did not believe that benefits offered were reasonable when 
compared to similar employers in the area. 
When security officers were asked whether they were satisfied with the level of 
health insurance provided by their employer, 38.4 percent or 131 respondents were 
satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employer, while 39.9 percent 
or 136 respondents were not satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their 
employer. 
2. Turnover 
The security officers in this survey were asked whether there is a high turnover 
rate among security officers where they work. In response, 41.9 percent or 143 
respondents believe that there is a high turnover among security officers where they 
work, and 28.7 percent or 98 respondents did not believe that there was a high turnover 
where they work. 
When asked the percentage of annual turnover among security officers where they 
work, 56 percent of the respondents reported that they believe that the annual turnover 
rate where they work is below 40 percent, and 75.4 percent of the respondents reported 
that they believe the annual turnover rate is below 60 percent. Further turnover rates were 
reported as follows:  
 23.5% (80): less than 20 percent;  
 32.5% (111): above 20 percent but below 40 percent;  
 19.4% (66): above 40 percent but below 60 percent;  
 14.3% (49): above 60 percent but below 80 percent;  
 6.2% (21): above 80 percent but below 100 percent;  
 2.05% (7): above 100 percent, but below 200 percent;  
 2.05% (7) above 200 percent.  
The security officers in this survey were asked a series of questions to determine 
what they thought were the contributing factors to employee turnover where they work. 
The first question was whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work 
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attributable to wages. In response, 35.5 percent or 121 of the respondents believed that 
turnover was attributable to wages, while 40.5 percent or 148 of the respondents believed 
that the turnover rate where they worked was not attributable to wages. 
The second question asked whether the turnover rate among security officers 
where they work was attributable to benefits (sick days, holidays, and vacation days). In 
response, 40.8 percent or 139 of the respondents believed that the turnover rate where 
they work was attributable to benefits, while 38.4 percent or 131 believed that the 
turnover rate where they worked could not be attributed to benefits. 
The third question asked whether the turnover rate among security officers where 
they work could be attributed to health insurance. In response, 32.3 percent or 110 of the 
respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work could be attributed to health 
insurance, and 42.8 percent or 146 respondents believed that the turnover rate where they 
work could not be attributed to health insurance. 
The fourth question asked whether the turnover rate among security officers 
where they work could be attributed to a lack of career growth. In response, 53.1 percent 
or 181 respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to 
lack of career growth, while 25.2 percent or 86 respondents believed that the turnover 
rate where they work was not attributable to lack of career growth. 
Question five asked whether the turnover rate among security officers where they 
work was attributable to a lack of training opportunities. In response, 13.5 percent or 46 
respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to lack of 
training opportunities, and 55.7 percent or 190 respondents believed that the turnover rate 
where they work was not attributable to lack of training opportunities. 
3. Training 
The security officers were asked how many hours of training they received before 
starting their current job. In response, 48.7 percent of the respondents reported receiving 
24 hours or more of training, while 51.3 percent reported receiving less than 24 hours of 
training. In addition, 11.1 percent or 38 respondents reported receiving 8 hours or less 
 59
training; 25.5 percent or 87 respondents reported receiving between 8 and 16 hours of 
training; 14.7 percent or 50 respondents reported receiving 16 to 24 hours of training; 
27.3 percent or 93 respondents reported receiving 24 to 40 hours of training; and 21.4 
percent or 73 respondents reported receiving more than 40 hours of training.  
The security officers were asked whether they felt that the amount of training they 
have received is sufficient to prepare them to meet their security officer responsibilities. 
In response, 70.1 percent or 239 respondents believed that the training they have received 
is sufficient to prepare them to meet their responsibilities as a security officer, and 18.5 
percent or 63 respondents did not believe that the training they have received is sufficient 
to prepare them to meet their responsibilities as a security officer. 
Training composite was created to measure 18 different types of training that was 
available to these security officers. These included loss prevention techniques, customer 
service and tenant relations, security technology, report writing, working with police, 
working with firefighters, working with emergency response units, suspicious packages, 
suspicious people, terrorism-related emergencies, patrolling inside and outside of 
facilities, reporting emergencies, building evacuations, NIMS training, CIMS training, 
performing regular emergency drills, enhanced security guard training, and terrorism 
training from the NYPD Shield Program. This composite was formulated using a Likert 
five-point scale, and the types of training were measured by the amount of different types 
of training received by the security officer. If a security officer received between one and 
three types of training, that would be equal to 1 on the Likert scale. Four to seven types of 
training equals 2, eight to eleven types of training was equal to 3, twelve to fifteen types 
of training was equal to 4, and sixteen to eighteen types of training was equal to 5 on the 
Likert scale. Of the security officers, 72.7 percent reported receiving between 8 and 18 of 
the different types of training that were available to them. Further, 2.1 percent or 7 
respondents reported receiving 0 types of training; 7.9 percent or 27 respondents reported 
receiving 1 to 3 types of training; 17.3 percent or 59 respondents reported receiving 4 to 7 
types of training; 26.1 percent or 89 respondents reported receiving 8 to 12 types of 
training; 30.5 percent or 104 respondents reported receiving 12 to 15 types of training; 
16.1 percent or 55 respondents reported receiving 16 to 18 types of training. 
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a. Loss Prevention 
One hundred seventy-nine respondents (52.5 percent) reported receiving 
loss prevention training. 
b. Customer Service and Tenant Relations 
Two hundred sixty-nine respondents (78.9 percent) reported receiving 
training in customer service and tenant relations. 
c. Training with Security Technology 
Two hundred fifteen respondents (63 percent) reported receiving training 
with security technology, e.g., CCTV. 
d. Training in Report Writing 
Two hundred sixty-nine respondents (78.9 percent) reported receiving 
training in report writing. 
e. Training for Working with the Police 
One hundred eighty respondents (52.8 percent) reported that they had 
received training for working with the police. 
f. Training for Working with Firefighters 
One hundred sixty respondents (46.9 percent) reported that they had 
received training for working with firefighters. 
g. Training for Working with Other Emergency Response Units  
One hundred seventy respondents (49.9 percent) reported receiving 
training for working with other types of emergency response units. 
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h. Reporting Emergencies 
Two hundred seventy-three respondents (80.1 percent) reported receiving 
training in how to report emergencies. 
i. Training in Conducting a Patrol Inside and Outside a Facility 
Two hundred ninety-two respondents (85.6 percent) reported receiving 
training in how to conduct a patrol inside and outside a facility and what to look for. 
j. Training in Identifying Suspicious Packages 
Two hundred fifty-three respondents (74.5 percent) reported receiving 
training in identifying suspicious packages. 
k. Training in Identifying Suspicious People 
Two hundred sixty-six respondents (78 percent) reported receiving 
training in identifying suspicious people. 
l. Training in Handling Terrorism-Related Emergencies 
Two hundred twenty-three respondents (65.4 percent) reported receiving 
training regarding handling terrorism-related emergencies. 
m. Training in Building Evacuations 
Two hundred seventeen respondents (63.6 percent) reported receiving 
training in building evacuations. 
n. Conducting Regular Emergency/Evacuation Drills 
One hundred forty-nine respondents (43.7 percent) reported conducting 
emergency/evacuation type drills. 
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o. Forty-Hour Enhanced Security Guard Training 
One hundred seventy-eight respondents (52.2 percent) reported that they 
had received the 40-hour enhanced security guard training. 
p. NIMS Training 
With regard to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) a key 
feature is the Incident Command System (ICS), which is supposed to be part of the 40-
hour enhanced security guard training. Although 52.2 percent of the respondents reported 
having received the enhanced security officer training, only 24.6 percent of the 
respondents reported having received training in the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). 
Eighty-four respondents (24.6 percent) reported receiving NIMS training. 
q. CIMS Training 
Seventy-six respondents (22.3 percent) reported receiving CIMS training. 
r. Training from the NYPD Shield Unit 
Ninety respondents (26.4 percent) reported receiving training from the 
NYPD Shield Unit. 
Compensating for security officers who are assigned to the airports (152) 
that are under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority of New York and the New Jersey 
Police, and analyzing the data for security officers who work in buildings under the 
jurisdiction of the NYPD, one sees a slight uptick in the percentage of security officers 
trained by the NYPD Shield Unit to 31.2 percent. In addition, there were 31 security 
officers who had previously received this training from the NYPD Shield Unit before 
going to work in the airports. 
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The training provided by the NYPD Shield Unit includes Terrorism 
Awareness for the Security Professional, Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 
Security Checkpoint Operations Course, Surveillance Detection for Commercial 
Infrastructure Operators and Security Staff, and Detecting Hostile Surveillance. 
4. Job Satisfaction 
When asked whether the present job makes good use of the respondent’s skills 
and abilities, 51.9 percent or 177 respondents reported that their present job makes good 
use of their skills and abilities; 28.2 percent or 96 respondents reported that their present 
job did not make good use of their skills and abilities. 
When asked whether they were proud to be an employee at their present job, 62.4 
percent or 213 respondents were proud to be an employee in their present job; 14.7 
percent or 50 respondents were not proud to be an employee in their present job. 
When asked whether the most capable employees are always the ones selected for 
promotion, 30.2 percent or 103 respondents believed that the most capable employees are 
always the ones selected for promotion, while 52.2 percent or 178 respondents did not 
believe that the most capable employees are always the ones selected for promotion. 
When asked the question “When assigned work I’ve never done before, I get the 
necessary instruction to do a good job,” 56.3 percent or 192 respondents believe that 
when assigned work they have never done before they get the necessary instruction to do 
a good job, and 28.2 percent or 96 respondents believe that when assigned work they 
have never done before, they do not get the necessary instruction to do a good job. 
When asked the question, “Communications from the top management are 
adequate for me to know what is going on in the organization,” 47.2 percent or 161 
respondents think that communications from top management are adequate for them to 
know what is going on in the organization, while 34.9 percent or 119 respondents do not 
think that communications from top management are adequate for them to know what is 
going on in the organization. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SECURITY OFFICER RESEARCH STUDY (2011) 
A total of 401 surveys were distributed; of those 341 or 85 percent were 
completed in their entirety and used as the sample population. The sample population of 
security officers captured during this research study was drawn from different working 
backgrounds and assigned to work at a number of different types of facilities. The sample 
population, although approximately three times larger than the original, was in fact 
statistically equivalent to the original survey with regard to the number of respondents 
who work in commercial office buildings in Manhattan—102 in 2004 and 95 in 2011 
respectively. 
The group that participated in the 40-hour training program was compared to the 
one that did not was evaluated (52.2 percent or 178 respondents reported that they had 
received the 40-hour enhanced security guard training). While there was a difference in 
the means between groups for “Job Satisfaction” and “Compensation/Benefits,” Leven’s 
test for equality of variance among groups was above .05 for all items, and all 
significance measures exceeded .05, suggesting that the independent t-test statistic 
supports a reporting difference between groups toward the following hypothesis: When 
increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of terrorism training, 
the level of training participation increases, and as the level of compensation increases, 
the level of job satisfaction also increases. 
The completion of additional training in loss prevention and customer 
service/relations, terrorism awareness/prevention, or emergency response to incidents 
increases the level of job satisfaction and in addition, by providing benefits and health 
care, also increases the level of job satisfaction. The correlations between 
“Compensation/Benefits” and “Job Satisfaction,” “Training Efficacy” and “Job 
Satisfaction,” and “Training Efficacy” and “Compensation/Benefits” are significant at the 
.01 level and suggests that “Compensation/Benefits” explains 39 percent of the variance 
in “Job Satisfaction” and supports Hypothesis #1, that providing compensation and 
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benefits to employees increases the level of job satisfaction and Hypothesis #2, as the 
level of compensation increases the level of job satisfaction also increases. “Training 
Efficacy” explains 17 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction” and supports 
Hypothesis #3, that the completion of additional training increases the level of job 
satisfaction. The perceived level of training efficacy explains 11 percent of the variation 
in the perceived value of “Compensation/Benefits” and supports Hypothesis #4, when 
increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of training, the level of 
training participation increases. 
If we interpret “Instruction to do a Good Job” as an identification of those who 
received training, then the data suggest that training is an important factor influencing 
“Proud to be an Employee Here.” Since “Proud to be and Employee Here” holds together 
with the other items measuring “Job Satisfaction” (Alpha .750), this suggests that training 
has a significant influence on “Job Satisfaction.” This first significant correlation between 
“Instruction to do a Good Job” and “Proud to be an Employee Here” suggests that 
“Instruction to do a Good Job” explains 42 percent of “Proud to be an Employee Here.” 
That conclusion supports Hypothesis #3—that the completion of training increases the 
level of job satisfaction—and thus supports Schmidt’s 2007 findings suggesting that the 
relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for 
employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmidt, 2007, p. 492). Another 
significant correlation found in this study was that between “Use of Skills” and “Proud to 
an Employee Here” (significant at the .01 level), which suggests that “Use of Skills—
possibly from training” influences 45 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction.” 
In an attempt to measure Hypothesis #5—as the level of job satisfaction 
decreases, the level of employee turnover increases—we would expect to see a strong 
correlation between “Job Satisfaction” and “Employee Turnover Rate.” Since the 
relationship between “Employee Satisfaction” (all five items) and “Employee Turnover” 
was not supported by the data collected in this study, the data that was collected 
represented perceived measures of employee turnover versus actual measures of 
employee turnover. Based on the limitations associated with measuring perceived 
employee turnover, prior studies identified in the literature are used to support the 
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relationship. There have been a number of studies conducted on the correlation between 
job satisfaction and employee turnover rates, training and organization commitment, and 
compensation, work motivation, and job satisfaction, and the field of study has ranged 
from health care workers, small business to large organizations, and fast-food franchises. 
The studies were conducted in England, France, Greece, and the United States. The 
studies found that there was a correlation between job satisfaction and employee turnover 
rates; some of the studies found that the results concurred with prior studies conducted on 
professional occupations (Ellinger, Ellinger, & Keller, 2003; Tansky & Cohen, 2001). 
The relationship between perceived access to training opportunities and an effective form 
of organizational commitment is moderated by job satisfaction but not job involvement, 
and that training and development contributes to desired workplace attitudes, including 
organizational commitment, which may in turn influence behaviors such as absenteeism 
and turnover rates (Bartlett, 2001, p. 335). 
The significant correlation between “Communications from Top Management” 
and “Necessary Instruction to Do a Good Job” suggests that “Communications from 
Management” explains 49 percent of “Instructions to do a Good Job.” This may be 
interpreted as management effectiveness in communicating training goals for a particular 
job or position. This also supports the idea that training may be perceived by 
management and employees as closely related to a job or position rather than a particular 
set of program goals or a program brand. This particular interpretation would require 
further investigation. 
B. COMPARISON OF THE 2004 AND 2011 RESEARCH STUDIES 
In 2011, a random selection (sample population) of 401 security guards was taken 
from a larger population of security officers; in the 2004 research study a random 
selection of 102 security guards was taken from a larger population. Although the sample 
populations in all likelihood in these two surveys have different respondents, there is a 
possibility that respondents were captured in both surveys because the sample population 
of in both surveys was obtained through a similar larger population obtained from SEIU 
local 32bj. 
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Random sampling was used to ensure that participants would remain anonymous, 
and thus it was impossible to confirm whether participants had contributed to both of 
these research studies. Random selection was also used to mitigate potential selection 
biases that might result from purposeful or convenience sampling and that might create 
issues related to internal validity. 
Considering that the larger population used in this research is similar in its work 
experience and backgrounds to the larger population used in the 2004 study, the author 
was able to compare the results of the 2004 study to the results of the current study even 
though the same sample population is not being measured in both studies. 
A review of the comparisons reveals that security officers have made some strides 
toward continuity of the workforce by decreasing turnover through increased wages and 
benefits. They have also increased preparedness through training, 80.1 percent or 273 
respondents reported receiving training in how to report emergencies. Respondents have 
also received training in identifying suspicious people and packages, not just reporting 
incidents: 74.5 percent or 254 respondents reported receiving training in identifying 
suspicious packages; 78 percent or 266 respondents reported receiving training in 
identifying suspicious people. Seventy-three respondents (21.4 percent) reported 
receiving more than 40 hours of training compared to only 6 percent of officers in 2004. 
A review of the statistics for working with emergency response units reveals some 
improvement in this area and plenty of room for continued improvement. One hundred 
eighty respondents (52.8 percent) reported that they received training for working with 
the police; 46.9 percent or 160 respondents reported that they received training for 
working with firefighters, and 49.9 percent or 170 respondents reported receiving training 
working with other types of emergency response units. Two hundred thirty-nine 
respondents (70.1 percent) believed that the training they have received is sufficient to 
prepare them meet their responsibilities as a security officer. 
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Areas in which security officers are still lacking include building evacuations and 
conducting emergency drills, the two preparations that were credited with saving 
thousands of lives in the World Trade Center Buildings on September 11. Compensating 
for personnel assigned to airports (152): 28 percent of the respondents who work in 
buildings have not been trained to help evacuate the building they work in, and 42.4 
percent of the respondents do not participate in regular emergency drills in their building.  
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With regard to National Incident Management System (NIMS), a key feature is 
the Incident Command System (ICS), which is supposed to be part of the 40-hour 
enhanced security guard training. Of the respondents surveyed, 75.4 percent reported that 
they have not received receiving training in the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). 
In summary, these findings confirm the fact that security officers have made some 
strides with regard to their preparedness levels as compared to the findings of the 
research study conducted in 2004. In some categories of preparedness, such as 
conducting emergency drills, however, they have a long way to go. There was some 
improvement in the area of working with police and firefighters. To further measure 
preparedness levels, a training composite was created to measure 18 different types of 
training available to these security officers. The composite was formulated using a Likert 
5-point scale, and the number of different types of training received by the security 
officers was measured. The percentage of security officers who reported having receiving 
between 8 and 18 of the different types of training was 72.7 percent, a significant 
improvement from 2004, where on average the security officers reported having 19 hours 
of training while having been on the job for 2.3 years. 
There has also been some improvement in the salaries of the security officers 
surveyed: 81.2 percent of the security officers reported earning $14 or more an hour, with 
54 percent reporting that they make more than $16 an hour, the equivalent of $33,280+ a 
year. The national annual median wage for a security officer/guard in 2008 was $23,820. 
The majority of officers reported making more than the national average, and some 
reported making close to $20 an hour. This is a significant finding, considering that 35.5 
percent or 121 respondents in this study believed that turnover was attributable to wages, 
compared to 80 percent of the respondents in the 2004 study. 
With regard to turnover rates, there has been some perceived improvement, as 
reflected by the fact that 23.5 percent or 80 respondents reported that the turnover rate 
was less than 20 percent; 56 percent of the respondents reported that the annual turnover 
rate where they work was below 40 percent, and 75.4 percent of the respondents reported 
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that the annual turnover rate was below 60 percent. These results are limited by the fact 
that the security officers were asked not hard statistics but what they believed the annual 
percentage was where they work. Sometimes perception is reality, however: when 
compared to a recent report on the private security services industry in the United States, 
which estimated that annual employee turnover in the industry exceeds 100 percent for 
many security companies and can be as high as 300–400 percent for smaller firms (SEIU, 
2010, p. 1), there seems to have been some improvement. This may be the subject of 
possible further research. 
Another surprising fact was that 53.1 percent or 181 respondents believed that the 
turnover rate was attributable to the lack of career growth, another possible subject of 
further research in this area. 
C. THE NYPD RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS  
The initiatives to be discussed were born out of the recommendations of the New 
York City Council and the New York City Public Advocates Office, as a result of the 
2004 research study. The actions taken by the NYPD as result of these recommendations 
for training and liaison programs with private security contributed to the current 
preparedness levels of these security officers and bears mentioning. The questions asked 
on the survey instrument about whether these security officers received this training are 
not measurable past the level of descriptive statistics for the purpose of this study, but 
they could be the bases for further research. 
The New York City Council and the New York City Public Advocates Office 
made two recommendations in 2005 that directly affected the New York Police 
Department. They were: 
1) The New York Police Department should strengthen coordination with private 
security units and unilaterally expand its coordination to work with heads of small as well 
as large security firms. 
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2) As part of a new citywide security protocol, the police, fire, and emergency 
response units and other first responders should coordinate their emergency response 
efforts with private security firms. 
In response to these recommendations, the NYPD consolidated its existing efforts 
with the private security industry that had originally been developed under community 
policing guidelines to help reduce crime. After September 11, the NYPD dramatically 
expanded its contacts with the private security sector through the Area Police Private 
Security Liaison (APPL) network, site security surveys, and regional infrastructure 
protection courses presented by the Counterterrorism Bureau. The growing worldwide 
terrorist threat and the recommendations made by the City Council and the Public 
Advocates Office required that the NYPD take its cooperation with private security to a 
new level. NYPD-Shield, established in July 2005, became the answer to that challenge. 
1. The NYPD Shield Program 
NYPD Shield was not intended to replace existing programs with the private 
security industry. Rather, it was established to bring all existing programs together under 
one umbrella and to serve as a clearinghouse for threat updates and key information on 
new briefings, industry-specific seminars, and the latest offerings from the 
Counterterrorism Bureau (Kelly, 2010). 
The NYPD Shield program is a force multiplier that significantly increases the 
effectiveness of the NYPD counterterrorism efforts by partnering with the private sector 
and other public agencies. Through training, conferences, and analytical briefs, the Shield 
program provides a venue for information sharing on emerging and evolving terrorist 
threats that may impact New York City. 
The program began in July 2005 with an initial enrollment of 800 members and 
has grown to more than 10,135 members. The Shield program has trained 17,070 people 
and conducted 633 training classes in terrorism awareness for security professional 
(TASP), vehicle-borne improvised explosive device security checkpoints (VIBED),  
detecting hostile surveillance, introduction to critical infrastructure protection, building 
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design for homeland security, surveillance detection for commercial infrastructure 
operators and security directors and managers, and active shooter incidents. 
There have been 25 conferences conducted and attended by 7,946 members. 
Conference presenters are usually members of the department with subject-matter 
expertise. Presentations include analysis of historical terrorism trends globally, as well as 
recent regional and domestic threats and events. Special conferences have been provided 
on the Times Square bombing, Mumbai, and school shootings. 
Analytical briefings are provided on a weekly basis, but they can be provided 
sooner on an event-specific incident basis. The analytical briefs are researched and 
prepared by intelligence research specialists assigned to the counterterrorism division. 
Those specialists prepare and make available to members sector-specific briefings (cyber 
security, CBRN, etc.), weekly regional reports (Iran, Iraq, Arabian Peninsula, Africa, 
etc.), incident-specific reports (Times Square bombing, Mumbai, etc.), and they also 
prepare reports on trends and analysis (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau, 2010). 
The NYPD Shield program offers six training opportunities for personnel within 
the corporate and private security and management sectors. In addition, the program 
offers two courses in port security. The requestor of the training must be employed in a 
corporate capacity, typically as a security director with an established proprietary or 
contractual security force within New York City. A private security vendor is not eligible 
unless sponsored by its corporate employer. The available training includes: 
Terrorism Awareness 
The course discusses how to recognize and identify terrorist-related physical and 
behavioral indicators, collect and process information, make appropriate notifications, 
and when necessary, take action during a terrorist attack. The topics discussed include 
introduction to terrorism, improvised explosive devices, indicators of suicide attacks, and 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. 
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Device Security Checkpoint Operations Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosives 
This is an important course due to the number of underground parking garages in 
New York City. In the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the terrorist used an 
improvised explosive device secreted in a Ryder rental van that entered the underground 
parking facility and detonated, creating a five-story-deep crater. The bomb was a 1,500-
pound urea nitrate–hydrogen gas–enhanced device that killed seven people, injured 
1,042, and stranded many more. The intent of the bombers was to detonate the bomb in 
the underground parking garage, causing the north tower (Tower One) to fall into the 
south tower (Tower Two), bringing them both down and killing thousands of people. 
 
Figure 7.   1993 Bombing of the World Trade Center (From ATF, 1993) 
The Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Security Checkpoint Operations 
Course is provided to corporate and private security personnel. The VBIED course is 
designed to provide hands-on instruction at the facility where the security officers work 
so that an assessment of the conditions at that facility can be included in the course plan. 
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The course is also designed to provide hands-on instruction regarding vehicle-borne 
explosive recognition. During the first phase of instruction, the student is provided 
various techniques and methods pertaining to the use of proper vehicle inspection during 
the utilization of security checkpoints at high-profile events and critical infrastructure 
locations. 
The second phase of instruction focuses primarily on the hands-on aspect of 
vehicle searches. The instruction and training include the various methods of explosive 
concealment in various types of vehicles; the use of proper interviewing techniques of 
operators and passengers of suspicious vehicles is demonstrated. 
Detecting Hostile Surveillance 
Detecting Hostile Surveillance is a course provided to law enforcement, corporate 
and private security directors, and managers. The course is broken into two phases. The 
first phase focuses primarily on the techniques used to detect hostile surveillance by 
identifying threat indicators, hostile surveillance methods, and staging locations. The 
second phase includes a practical exercise by conducting a brief facility and area analysis 
in which the participants track and analyze potential hostile surveillance. 
The participants who complete this course are better able to identify hostile 
surveillance and demonstrate an ability to produce an effective facility and area analysis 
that can assist their organization and the law enforcement community to prevent and 
interrupt terrorist activity before it strikes. 
Surveillance Detection for Commercial Infrastructure Operators and Security 
Staff 
The surveillance detection course is designed for commercial infrastructure 
operators and security staff. It provides a foundation for developing and applying plans 
that include the fundamentals of surveillance detection, recognizing the indicators of an 
imminent attack, implementing appropriate responses, and reporting observations with 
the necessary details to aid law enforcement officials. 
 79
This course consists of learning modules that cover the following topic areas: 
attack methodology, attack cycle, pre-incident indicators, vulnerability analysis, 
vulnerability analysis exercise, area analysis, red zone analysis, identifying hostile 
surveillance positions, red zone design practical exercise, surveillance detection, 
surveillance detection position practical exercise, developing a surveillance detection 
plan, observation and reporting. Each of these modules of instruction incorporates 
practical hands-on learning exercises to reinforce the concepts and skills taught. This 
course ends with a capstone field exercise so that the participants can apply the lessons 
learned. 
Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Protection Course 
This course is intended to equip members of the law enforcement and corporate-
security community with the skill set required for deterring, detecting, and identifying 
potential terrorist activity. This course also introduces the principles of risk assessment 
(an examination of the vulnerabilities associated with the infrastructure of a facility), 
basic methods of security, and the major components of a municipality’s critical 
infrastructure. 
Building Design for Homeland Security Course 
The goal of this course is to enhance the understanding of the participants in the 
measures and technology available to reduce risk from terrorist attack. Included in this 
understanding is the process for assessing risk to focus upon which mitigation measures 
have the greatest applicability and benefit. The participants learn the design approaches 
to mitigate man-made hazards and comprehend the tradeoffs needed to optimize various 
design requirements. 
Since September 11, the NYPD has restructured its mission to include 
counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection. It proactively identifies and 
assesses the location and targets in New York City that are most vulnerable to a terrorist 
attack, and it partners with key private and law enforcement personnel for the protection 
of the city’s assets. 
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2. Lower Manhattan Security Initiative 
The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative was also developed in response to 
recommendations that were made in an effort to coordinate the NYPD response efforts 
with the private security firms in lower Manhattan. This partnership was formed from 
necessity in order to develop a comprehensive plan to protect lower Manhattan and the 
corporate entities that do business there. The plan that was implemented included 
consolidating existing private/public security cameras and building an intelligent closed-
circuit TV system (CCTV) to protect lower Manhattan against terrorist events. 
Figure 8.   Lower Manhattan Security Initiative Command Center  
(From NYPD, 2010) 
The New York Police Department, in partnership with private corporate security 
companies, is in the process of building a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) surveillance system 
that will be more sophisticated and effective in identifying and alerting users to a possible 
threat or incident than the closed-circuit TV system used by police in London and other 
British cities. Although the NYPD Lower Manhattan Security Initiative CCTV system 
NYPD 
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was modeled after the London system, it is not quite as extensive in the number of 
cameras incorporated into the system at this time. The NYPD Lower Manhattan Initiative 
currently has more than 2300 cameras controlled and operated by a combination of 
private and public entities (CounterTerror NYC, 2011). A total of 3,000 cameras from 
both NYPD and private stakeholders will be deployed to the Lower Manhattan Security 
Initiative catchment area by 2011. The catchment area covers a 1.7-square-mile area from 
the tip of Manhattan on the south to a line parallel to Canal Street from the East River to 
the Hudson River. The area covered by this system is some 1.7 square miles, and it is 
considered to be an area of extremely high interest to terrorists.  
 
Figure 9.   Lower Manhattan Security Initiative Command Center  
(From NYPD, 2010) 
The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative is a public/private partnership between 
the NYPD and private security companies located in lower Manhattan. The NYPD assists 
the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative participants in developing and exercising their 
detailed business continuity plans. The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative command 
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center/coordination center enables information sharing between NYPD and the 
stakeholders. Private-sector personnel are colocated with police personnel in the center. 
The center is the intake point for the CCTV feeds. The stakeholders get real-time access 
to those feeds with real-time event tracking. The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative 
coordination center is also the command center for the Lower Manhattan Security 
Initiative patrol resources. The private security companies as stakeholders also get 
briefings and intelligence updates, and text alerts are given to key executives of both 
private and public center entities regarding new threats and other urgent matters. There 
are weekly conference calls with NYPD officials and the opportunity for training for the 
private security personnel. 
Before September 11, responses to terrorism followed the old incident model. 
Police reacted to individual terrorist incidents, such as the World Trade Center bombing 
in February 1993, the Tokyo subway nerve agent attack in March 1995, the Oklahoma 
City bombing in April 1995, and the Olympics in 1996, as incidents and crime scenes. 
Law enforcement did not systematically assess and identify terrorism as a problem, 
analyze the wealth of information bearing on it, partner with communities to craft 
responses, or regularly evaluate its own efforts. Law enforcement was trained to respond 
to incidents of terrorism. However, the mission of law enforcement since September 11 
has been to detect, preempt, and disrupt terrorist operations. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTION AND TRAINING 
GUIDELINES FOR PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS 
A review of the comparisons reveals that security officers have made some strides 
toward continuity of the workforce by decreasing turnover through increased wages and 
benefits. Preparedness through training has also increased. The original hypothesis was 
that, if there is a correlation between satisfaction with workplace training and overall job 
satisfaction, as stated in the previous studies, then we should see a similar outcome for 
the group of security officers with additional training who were surveyed now. 
The New York City Public Advocate made an additional recommendation that the 
state legislature should adopt legislation requiring additional hours of prelicensing 
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instruction—beyond the currently mandated eight hours—as part of a new minimum 
requirement to become a security officer. This recommendation is valid not only for New 
York State but for other states as well because the selection and training criteria for a 
private security officer varies from state to state. The selection and training criteria also 
vary between federal buildings and state and local buildings; it ranges from 
comprehensive training requirements for every private security officer to little or no 
training for private security officers. There is a need, therefore, to establish minimum 
national criteria for the selection and training of all private security officers.  
The sample population in this study was separated into two groups: those who 
participated in the 40-hour training program and those who did not participate in the 
program. While there was a difference in the mean between groups for “Job Satisfaction” 
and “Compensation/Benefits,” independent t-test statistics did support reporting a 
difference between groups.  
This study revealed that there is a correlation between “Compensation/Benefits” 
and “Job Satisfaction.” “Training Efficacy” and “Job Satisfaction,” and “Training 
Efficacy” and “Compensation/Benefits” that was significant at the .01 level, suggesting 
that “Compensation/Benefits” explains 39 percent of the variance in “Job Satisfaction” 
and that providing compensation/benefits to employees increases the level of job 
satisfaction; as the level of compensation increases, the level of job satisfaction also 
increases. “Training Efficacy” explains 17 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction” 
and supports the conclusion that the completion of additional training increases the level 
of job satisfaction. The perceived level of training efficacy explains 11 percent of the 
variation in the perceived value of “Compensation/Benefits” and supports the theory that 
when increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of training, the 
level of training participation increases, and as the level of compensation increases, the 
level of job satisfaction also increases. 
This first significant correlation between “Instruction to do a Good Job” and 
“Proud to be an Employee Here” suggests that “Instruction to do a Good Job” explains 42 
percent of “Proud to be an Employee Here,” which supports the conclusion that the 
completion of training increases the level of job satisfaction, thus supporting Schmidt’s 
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2007 finding suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall 
job satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmidt, 
2007, p. 492). The third significant correlation (significant at the .01 level) between “Use 
of Skills” and “Proud to be an Employee Here” suggests that “Use of Skills—possibly 
from training” influences 45 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction.” 
The results of this study support the establishment of a private security officer 
selection and training guideline as recommended by the American Society for Industrial 
Security (ASIS). This would help develop and encourage the adoption of minimum 
national criteria for the selection and training of all private security officers and thus 
contribute to better preparedness levels and continuity of the workforce. 
ASIS has concluded that the development of minimum criteria has become 
essential to enable the private security industry to meet the needs of providing effective 
security to its clients, as well as meeting the demands associated with new homeland 
security initiatives. Effective security in today’s environment requires that security 
officers be familiar with all aspects of a facility’s security system in order to be able to 
assess and contain potential threats. Security officers are required to be well versed in 
emergency procedures and able to work with an organization to ensure that emergency 
procedures can be implemented successfully. They also need to be able to work closely 
and effectively with public safety personnel (ASIS,  2004, p. 11). 
The ability of U.S. companies to contribute to the homeland security project and 
protect the nation’s critical infrastructure depends largely on the competence of the 
private security officers that they employ. Therefore, private security officers and 
applicants for private security officer positions should be thoroughly screened and 
trained. 
The private security industry is currently having difficulty retaining personnel. 
These additional screening processes could alleviate some of the turnover by weeding out 
unqualified individuals during the background and training process. It may also cause a 
shortage of personnel. With the natural order of supply and demand, it could be argued  
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that a shortage of qualified individuals could be a catalyst for improving the problem of 
low salaries. If salaries are improved, more qualified applicants for the positions may 
potentially be attracted. 
The real constraint in implementing the screening and training criteria is the fact 
that the security industry is regulated by the state in which it is working. Some of the big 
security companies have security contracts in a number of different states, requiring 
conformity to the different regulations imposed by each state. To address these issues, 
ASIS revised its Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guidelines in 2010 
(ASIS GDL PSO-2010). “Committee members realized there isn’t a one-size-fits-all 
approach to officer selection,” said Bernard D. Greenawalt, CPP, vice president, 
Securitas Security Services USA Inc., and chairman of the PSO Guideline Committee. 
“Not every company’s security requirements are the same and criteria vary from state to 
state. This revised guideline offers companies the flexibility to implement the strategies 
that meet their specific business and security needs” (Moeser, 2010, p. 1.) 
These guidelines are recommendations for minimum selection and training 
qualifications to help improve the performance of private security officers and the quality 
of security services. They provide the framework for private security officer job 
descriptions and recommended minimum selection criteria, as well as an outline for the 
design and delivery of private security officer training by employers and other agencies 
(ASIS, 2010, p. 1). 
In developing these new guidelines, ASIS relaxed its 2004 recommendation of 
establishing a requirement that each private security officer receive 48 hours of training 
within the first 100 days of employment (ASIS, 2004, p. 16). ASIS is now recommending 
that pre-assignment training be in accordance with all applicable legal requirements, that 
on-the-job training be commensurate with position requirements (e.g., 8–16 hours), and 
that annual training be sufficient to maintain job proficiency (e.g., 8 hours) (ASIS, 2010, 
p. 8). These current guidelines are in slight contradiction to the federal requirements for 
security officers. The federal requirements require that all security officers protecting 
federal facilities undergo background suitability checks and complete approximately 128 
hours of training before being assigned to a post or an area of responsibility. Even 
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discounting the 40 hours of firearms training from the federal requirement, the security 
officer is still required to complete 88 hours of training before taking a post in a federal 
facility. In addition, ASIS also recommends that private security officers pass a written 
and/or performance examination(s) to demonstrate that he/she understands the subject 
matter being taught. 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH 
With regard to turnover rates, there has been some perceived improvement, as 
reflected in the fact that 75.4 percent of respondents reported that they believed the 
annual turnover rate was below 60 percent. When compared to a recent report on the 
private security services industry in the United States—which estimated that annual 
employee turnover in the industry exceeds 100 percent for many security companies and 
can be as high as 300–400 percent for smaller firms (SEIU, 2010, p. 1), there seems to 
have been some improvement. The results of this study were limited by the fact that the 
security officers were asked what they perceived the annual turnover rate to be. 
The second significant correlation between “Communications from Top 
Management” and “Necessary Instruction to Do a Good Job” suggests that 
“Communications from Management” explains 49 percent of “Instructions to do a Good 
Job.” This may be interpreted as management effectiveness in communicating training 
goals for a particular job or position. This also supports the idea that training may be 
perceived by management and employees as closely related to a job or position rather 
than a particular set of program goals or a program brand. This particular interpretation 
would require further investigation. 
The NYPD Shield program and the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative were 
born out of the recommendations of the New York City Council and the New York City 
Public Advocates Office as a result of the 2004 research study. The actions taken by the 
NYPD as result of these recommendations regarding training and liaison programs with 
private security contributed to the current preparedness levels of these security officers  
and bear mentioning as the basis for further research. Lastly, the fact that 53.1 percent or 
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181 respondents believed that the turnover rate was attributable to lack of career growth 
makes it fertile ground for further research in this area. 
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APPENDIX A. RESEARCH STUDY (2004) AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PUBLIC ADVOCATE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 2004 RESEARCH 
STUDY 
Between October 14 and October 19, 2004, researchers from the Public 
Advocate’s office interviewed 102 security officers who worked in 39 of Manhattan’s 
most prominent and iconic Class A commercial buildings and landmarks. These officers 
worked for the city’s largest private security contractors, including Copstat (22 percent of 
officers interviewed), Securitas (17 percent) Mulligan (15 percent), Topguard (14 
percent), Summit (7 percent), and Classic (7 percent). 
Summary of Findings: 
 Security officers’ wages were low, and healthcare benefits were 
unaffordable or not offered. 
 Turnover was rampant: nearly one-quarter of security officers 
stayed at their job one year or less. 
 Most officers reported having less training than New York State 
requires. 
 Training failed to emphasize terrorism awareness, working with 
police, or firefighters. 
 Security officers were told to report emergencies, rather than 
taught their role in responding to them. 
 New York’s low training standards have not been revised since 
1992 and are outdated. 
 The state legislature needs to update the curriculum and address 
terrorism in security guard training. 
 The New York Department of State does not sufficiently police 
contractors to ensure that the security officers they employ are 
fully licensed and trained. 
 High turnover in New York is due to low wages and lack of 
opportunities. 
 98
 Other large cities like Chicago and San Francisco use industry-
specific minimum wages, which help promote a more stable 
workforce (Sheppard and Mintz-Roth, 2005, p. 1). 
Interview Findings: 
1. Most guards report having less training than the state’s low requirement. 
 12% of security officers report having no training at all. 
 17% have less than the state’s required 8 hours of pre-hire training. 
 On average, security officers reported having 19 hours of training 
while having been in their job for 2.3 years. By state law, a 
security officer in his second year of employment should have 40 
hours of training. Only 6% of officers we spoke to report having 
40 hours of training or more.  
2. Training fails to emphasize terrorism, working with police, or firefighters. 
 Only 37% of security officers report being trained to work with 
police officers. 
 37% report being trained to work with firefighters. 
 Just 56% were trained to handle terrorism-related emergencies. 
 51% knew how to coordinate with emergency response units.  
3. Instead, training emphasizes reporting emergencies rather than helping 
with them. 
 79% have been trained to report emergencies, after: 
 Identifying suspicious packages; 
 Identifying suspicious people. 
 33% have not been trained to help evacuate the building. 
 40% do not participate in regular emergency drills in their 
building. 
4. Wages are low and healthcare benefits are unaffordable or not available. 
 Reported wages ranged from the federal minimum wage of $5.15 
to $16.25 per hour, while the average wage was $9.86 per hour. 
Most officers work 40-hour weeks. 
 43% receive health insurance provided by their job. Many choose 
not to participate in healthcare plans because they are too 
expensive. 
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5. Turnover is rampant: nearly one-quarter of security officers stay at their 
job one year or less. 
 25% of officers surveyed have less than a year of experience at the 
building where they work. 
 Buildings replace nearly all of their security staff every one to two 
years, and one quarter of those positions are replaced four times 
per year. Other studies have reported even higher turnover rates. 
 Low wages, reported by nearly 80% of security officers, and lack 
of benefits, reported by over half, were cited as the main causes of 
turnover (Sheppard and Mintz-Roth, 2005, p. 6). 
Recommendations: 
 The state legislature should adopt legislation requiring additional 
hours of pre-licensing instruction—beyond the currently mandated 
eight hours—as part of a new minimum requirement to become a 
security officer. 
 The Department of State’s Division of Licensing should strengthen 
and expand its auditing of security companies to ensure that all 
security officers are properly licensed and trained. Spot checks 
may be an effective tactic. 
 The Office of Public Safety within the Department of State’s 
Division of Criminal Justice Services should revise and strengthen 
the training curricula to reflect current security concerns, such as 
terrorism, and update the curriculum regularly to address evolving 
threats and concerns. 
 All private security officers in commercial office buildings should 
be required to complete comprehensive New York State–approved 
security officer training programs. A good example is Local 
32BJ’s Training Fund 40-hour New York Safe and Secure program 
that includes state-of-the-art segments on terrorism, evacuation 
procedures and coordination with police, fire and emergency 
personnel during an emergency. 
 As called for in City Council Resolution 569, the state legislature 
and the governor should allow municipal legislative bodies to 
adopt more stringent legislation in relation to training, background 
checks and licensing/registration for private security personnel to 
address the deficiency of current security measures. 
 The New York Police Department should strengthen coordination 
with private security units and unilaterally expand its coordination 
to work with heads of small as well as large security firms. 
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 As part of a new citywide security protocol, the police, fire, and 
emergency response units and other first responders should all 
coordinate their emergency response efforts with private security 





Figure 10.   Security Guard Survey, October 2004 
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B. ENHANCED SECURITY GUARD TRAINING PROGRAM 
New York State believes that because 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in 
the United States belongs to private enterprise and corporations, those security officers 
are literally one of the nation’s first groups of defenders and play an integral role in 
prevention and deterrence efforts. The state also believes that success in prevention and 
deterrence of both general crime and terrorist acts as well begins with the establishment 
of a baseline and the maintenance of a robust all-hazards and all-crimes management 
infrastructure. The professional security officer industry in New York State, with in 
excess of 140,000 certified security officers, constitutes that baseline.  
New York State established the enhanced security guard training program to 
provide security officers with the basic awareness of terrorism issues that can potentially 
affect responsibilities within the purview of their employment. The program was 
designed to improve observation, detection, and reporting capabilities, while enhancing 
coordination capability with other emergency-response professionals. In addition, this 
program was designed to elaborate on previously provided instruction, thereby elevating 
participants’ familiarity with access control issues and security technology. 
The enhanced security guard training program provides instruction in the 
following topical areas: Information and Intelligence Sharing; Terrorism Indicators and 
Trends; WMD Standardized Awareness Training; Anti-Surveillance Strategies; 
Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessments; Safety and Security—
Emergency Planning; National Incident Management (NIMS) training to include, IS-700 
National Incident Management System—An Introduction; and ICS-100 Introduction to 
Incident Command System (ICS); the Fundamentals of Patrol; Criminal and Civil Law—
Powers and Limitations; Cooperation and Coordination in Public Relations and Basic 
First Aid (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 4). 
Purpose: 
The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program is intended to support and 
complement the existing security officer training and counterterrorism efforts in New 
York State by providing training and education designed to: 
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 Improve observation, detection, and reporting skills; 
 Improve coordination with local police, fire, and emergency 
services; 
 Provide and improve skills in working with advanced security 
technology, including surveillance and access control procedures, 
consisting of instruction requiring at least forty hours of training, 
including 3 hours of training devoted to terrorism awareness; and  
 Has been certified as a qualified program by the state office of 
homeland security (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 
2006, p. 4). 
Goals: 
The enhanced security guard training program is intended to support and 
complement the current security officer training and counterterrorism efforts of the state 
of New York. Through this program security officers gain an increased level of training 
and knowledge pertaining to security concerns and terrorism-related issues in support of 
their role as security specialists and the responsibilities inherent within the purview of 
their profession. 
Cognitive Goal: 
To provide participants with the basic knowledge and capability to detect and 
discern potential criminal and terrorist-related activities through a cohesive industrywide 
effort, promoting a robust environment of prevention and deterrence. 
Affective Goal: 
To provide participants with an appreciation for the complexity and enormity of 
criminal and terrorism-related activities, as well as an awareness of ongoing 
counterterrorism efforts on a local, state, and national level (Enhanced Security Guard 
Training Program, 2006, p. 9). 
Enhanced Security Guard Training 
Program of Instruction: 
 Section 1—Course Introduction/Historical Perspectives 
 Section 2—Criminal and Civil Law 
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 Section 3—Information Gathering and Sharing 
 Section 4—Terrorism Indicators and Trends 
 Section 5—Anti-Surveillance Efforts 
 Section 6—Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability 
Assessment Awareness 
 Section 7—Security and Safety Emergency Planning 
 Section 8—Fundamentals of Patrol—Access Control 
 Section 9—Fundamentals of Patrol—Communications, 
Cooperation, and Public Relations 
 Section 10—WMD Standardized Awareness 
 Section 11—IS-700 National Incident Management System 
(NIMS): An Introduction 
 Section 12—ICS-100: Introduction to ICS 
 Section 13—Basic First Aid 
Additionally the participants will be able to: 
 Identify/list information sharing strategies available within NYS; 
 Identify/list communication avenues within NYS to report 
suspicious or potential criminal or terrorist related activity; 
 Distinguish/explain the difference between information and 
intelligence; 
 Describe/explain common methods of operation of terrorist 
groups; 
 Describe/explain potential indicators of a suicide/homicide bomb 
attack; 
 Describe/explain the importance of pre-operational surveillance; 
 Describe/explain the methods utilized to protect critical 
infrastructure and key assets; 
 Describe/explain what Risk and Vulnerability Assessments are; 
 Describe and explain the purpose of the National Incident 
Management System NIMS; 
 Describe and explain basic Incident Command System (ICS); 
 Describe in detail the importance of Access Control; 
 Identify and list local resources available to professional security 
personnel for information resources and support; 
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Discussion Material:  
As events that may impact the role of security specialists are capricious and may 
shift on a frequent basis, discussion will be generated on a daily basis (where 
appropriate), consistent with current events to aid attendees in better understanding their 
evolving role as security specialists. 
Participant Evaluation and Responsibilities: 
Participant’s successful achievement of goals will be evaluated through a 
combination of psychomotor, cognitive, and affective evaluation consistent with the 
desired learning outcome of each individual section and or module. 
Additionally participants are required to complete course evaluations consistent 
with Kirkpatrick’s four-level model of evaluation (level one—reaction), and student 
evaluations that focus on: 
 The participant’s knowledge at the beginning of this program; 
 The participant’s knowledge at the conclusion of this program; 
 The value of the materials, information and knowledge conveyed 
during this instruction; and 
 The relevance of the instruction in relation to the participant’s 
duties and responsibilities at a specified work location. 
Participant Requirements: 
All course participants must be Security Guards as defined in the New York State 
General Business and Executive Laws or management/staff members working within, 
for, or with a licensed security entity. 
The New York State Office of Homeland Security Enhanced Security Guard 
Training Program is an extension of previously provided training as governed by New 
York State law. Therefore, security guards participating within this course of instruction 
must have satisfactorily completed all necessary training requirements (Enhanced 
Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 14).| 
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This program of instruction is consistent with and in recognition of Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8), which calls for a 
National Preparedness Goal that establishes measurable priorities, targets, and a common 
approach to developing needed capabilities. The goal utilized a Capabilities-Based 
Planning approach to help answer the questions “how prepared are we?”, “how prepared 
do we need to be?” and “how do we prioritize efforts to help answer to close the gap?” A 
central objective of Capabilities-Based Planning is the identification of target level of 
capabilities that Federal, State, local, and tribal entities must achieve to perform critical 
tasks for homeland security missions. Capabilities are combinations of resources that 
provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from performance of one or 
more critical tasks, under specified conditions and performance standards. Version 1.0 of 
the Target Capabilities List (TCL) identifies 36 target capabilities (HSPD-8, 2003). 
Additionally, this program recognizes and is consistent with the Universal Task 
List (UTL) which “defines what tasks need to be performed by Federal, State, local, and 
tribal jurisdictions and the private sector to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from events defined in the National Planning Scenarios” in the following areas: 
Common 
 Planning (Training) (All Modules) 
Prevent Mission Area 
 Information Gathering and Sharing, Section 3 
 Terrorism Indicators and Trends, Section 4 
 WMD Standardized Awareness, Section 10 
 Anti-Surveillance Efforts, Section 5 
 Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessments, 
Section 6 
 Fundamentals of Patrol—Access Control, Section 8 
 Fundamentals of Patrol—Communications, Cooperation, and 
Public Relations; Section 9 
Protect Mission Area 
 Information Gathering and Sharing, Section 3 
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 WMD Standardized Awareness, Section 10 
 Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessments, 
Section 6 
 Security and Safety Emergency Planning, Section 7 
 Fundamentals of Patrol—Communications, Cooperation, and 
Public Relations; Section 9 
Respond Mission Area 
 WMD Standardized Awareness, Section 10 
 Security and Emergency Planning, Section 7 
 IS-700 National Incident Management System (NIMS), An 
Introduction, Section 11 
 ICS-100: Introduction to ICS, Section 12 
 Fundamentals of Patrol—Communications, Cooperation, and 
Public Relations; Section 9 
 Basic First Aid, Section 13 
In addition to compliance with and guidance obtained from HSPD-8, this program 
was developed in accordance with compliance standards of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, so as to ensure 
standardization and conformity with nationally accepted practices and the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 
2006, pp. 5, 6). 
Guidance was also obtained from the Office for Domestic Preparedness (Grants 
and Training), Emergency Responder Guidelines; Awareness Level, as follows: 
 Recognize Hazardous Materials Incidents. 
 Know the protocols used to detect the potential presence of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) agents or materials. 
 Know and follow self-protection measures for WMD events and 
hazardous materials events. 
 Know procedures for protecting a potential crime scene. 
 Know and follow agency/organization’s scene security and control 
procedures for WMD and hazardous materials events. 
 108
 Possess and know how to properly use equipment to contact 
dispatcher or higher authorities to report information at the scene 
and to request additional assistance or emergency response 
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APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM 2011 
RESEARCH STUDY 
A. POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS 
A total of 401 surveys were distributed, and 341, or 85 percent of them, were 
completed in their entirety. The sample population of security officers that was captured 
during this research study was from different working backgrounds and assigned to work 
at a number of different types of facilities. These facilities included office buildings that 
were located mainly in Manhattan, including the World Trade Center construction site, 
public/government facilities, schools, and airports. The airports that were captured in this 
random sampling of security officers included JFK Airport and LaGuardia Airport in 
Queens, New York, and Newark Airport located in New Jersey. Of the 341 respondents, 
152 or 44.6 percent reported working in airports, 73 or 21.4 percent worked in 
public/government facilities, 95 or 27.9 percent worked in office buildings, and 21 or 6.2 
percent worked in a school as depicted in Table 10. 




The range for compensation the survey instrument was from under $10 an hour to 
more than $16 an hour. Of the sample population of 341, 184 or 54 percent of the 
respondents reported making more than $16 an hour, 93 or 27.2 percent of the 
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respondents stated that they made between $14–$16 a hour, 43 or 12.6 percent of the 
respondents stated that they made $12–$14 a hour, 14 or 4.1 percent of the respondents 
stated that they made $10–$12, and 7 or 2.1 percent of the respondents stated that they 
made under $10 a hour as depicted in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Hourly Wage Rate 
 
One hundred eighty-two or 53.4 percent of respondents indicated dissatisfaction 
or strong dissatisfaction with their wages; 92 or 27 percent of the respondents indicated 
satisfaction or strong satisfaction with their current wages; and 67 or 19.6 percent of the 
respondents were undecided, as depicted in Table 12. 





The security officers were asked whether benefits (sick days, holidays, and 
vacation days) offered are fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers in 
their geographic area. A review of the 341 respondents’ answers revealed that 108 or 31.7 
percent of the officers disagreed or strongly disagreed or did not believe that benefits 
were reasonable when compared to similar employers in the area. One hundred seventy-
one of the officers or 50.1 percent agreed or strongly agreed or believed that benefits 
were fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers, and 62 of the officers or 
18.2 percent were undecided, as depicted in Table 13. 
Table 13.   Reasonable Compensation Benefits 
 
3. Health Insurance 
The security officers were asked whether they were satisfied with the level of 
health insurance provided by your employer. A review of the 341 respondents’ answers 
revealed that 136 respondents or 39.9 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed or were not 
satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employers. One hundred 
thirty-one respondents or 38.4 percent agreed or strongly agreed and were satisfied with 
the level of health insurance provided by their employers, and 74 respondents or 21.7 
percent were undecided as depicted in Table 14. 
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Table 14.   Satisfaction with Health Insurance Benefits 
 
C. EMPLOYEE TURNOVER 
1. Turnover Rate 
The security officers in this survey were asked whether there is a high turnover 
rate among security officers where they work. A review of the data from the 341 
respondents reveals that 143 respondents or 41.9 percent of the sample population agrees 
or strongly agrees that there is a high turnover among security officers where they work. 
Ninety-eight respondents or 28.7 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that there was a 
high turnover where they work, and 100 respondents or 29.4 percent were undecided as 
depicted in Table 15. 
 121
Table 15.   Employee Turnover Rate 
 
2. Turnover Percentage 
When asked the percentage of annual turnover among security officers at the 
respondents’ place of employment, of the 341 respondents in the sample population, 80 
or 23.5 percent reported that the turnover rate was less than 20 percent; 111 or 32.5 
percent reported a turnover rate of above 20 percent, but below 40 percent; 66 or 19.4 
percent reported a turnover rate of above 40 percent, but below 60 percent; 49 or 14.3 
percent reported a turnover rate of above 60 percent but below 80 percent; 21 or 6.2 
percent reported a turnover rate above 80 percent but below 100 percent; 7 or 2.05 
percent reported a turnover rate above 100 percent but below 200 percent; and 7 or 2.05 
percent reported a turnover rate above 200% as depicted in Table 16. A total of 56 
percent of the respondents reported that they believed that the annual turnover rate where 
they work was below 40 percent, and 75.4 percent of the respondents reported that they 
believed the annual turnover rate was below 60 percent. 
 122
Table 16.   Employee Annual Turnover Percentage 
 
3. Factors Contributing to the Perceived Turnover Rate 
The security officers were asked a series of question about what they thought 
were the contributing factors to employee turnover where they work. The first question 
asked was whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work is 
attributable to wages. Of the 341 respondents 138 or 40.5 percent disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to wages. One hundred 
twenty-one or 35.5 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that turnover was 
attributable to wages, and 82 respondents or 24 percent were undecided as depicted in 
Table 17. 
Table 17.   Employee Turnover Attributable to Wages 
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The second question asked whether the turnover rate among security officers 
where respondents work is attributable to benefits (sick days, holidays, and vacation 
days). Of the 341 respondents, 131 or 38.4 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
the turnover rate where they work was attributable to benefits. One hundred thirty-nine or 
40.8 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that turnover was attributable to 
benefits, and 71 or 20.8 percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted in Table 
18. 
Table 18.   Employee Turnover Attributable to Benefits 
 
The third question asked was whether the turnover rate among security officers 
where respondents work is attributable to health insurance. Of the 341 respondents, 146 
or 42.8 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that the turnover rate 
where they work was attributable to health insurance. One hundred ten or 32.3 percent of 
the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that health insurance was a contributing factor 
to turnover, and 85 or 24.9 percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted in 
Table 19. 
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Table 19.   Employee Turnover Attributable to Health Insurance 
 
Fourthly respondents were asked whether the turnover rate among security 
officers where they work is attributable to a lack of career growth. Of the 341 
respondents, 86 or 25.2 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that the turnover rate 
where they work is attributed to lack of career growth. One hundred eighty-one or 53.1 
percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the turnover rate where they 
work is attributable to lack of career growth, and 74 or 21.7 percent of the respondents 
were undecided, as depicted in Table 20. 
Table 20.   Employee Turnover Attributable to Lack of Career Growth 
 
The fifth question asked was whether the turnover rate among security officers 
where respondents work is attributable to a lack of training opportunities. Of the 341 
respondents, 190 or 55.7 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that the turnover rate 
where they work is attributed to lack of training opportunities. Forty-six or 13.5 percent  
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agreed or strongly agreed that lack of training opportunities contributed to the turnover 
rate where they work, and 105 or 30.8 percent of the respondents were undecided, as 
depicted in Table 21. 
Table 21.   Employee Turnover Attributable to Lack of Training Opportunities 
 
D. TRAINING 
1. Hours of Training Received 
The security officers were asked how many hours of training they had received 
before starting their current job. Of the 341 respondents, 38 or 11.1 percent reported 
receiving 8 hours or less of training. Eighty-seven or 25.5 percent of the respondents 
reported receiving between 8 and 16 hours of training. Fifty or 14.7 percent of the 
respondents reported receiving 16 to 24 hours of training. Ninety-three or 27.3 percent of 
the respondents reported receiving 24 to 40 hours of training, and 73 or 21.4 percent 
reported receiving more than 40 hours of training, as depicted in Table 22. Of the 
respondents 48.7 percent reported receiving 24 hours or more of training, while 51.3% 
reported receiving less than 24 hours of training  
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Table 22.   Training Hours Received before Current Job 
 
2. Sufficient Training Received 
The security officers were asked whether they felt that the amount of training they 
have received was sufficient to prepare them to meet their security officer 
responsibilities. Of the 341 respondents, 63 or 18.5 percent disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that the training they have received was sufficient to prepare them to meet their 
responsibilities as a security officer. Two hundred thirty-nine or 70.1 percent of the 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the training they have received was sufficient 
to prepare them to meet their responsibilities as a security officer. Thirty-nine or 11.4 
percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted inTable 23. 
Table 23.   Training Sufficient to Meet Security Guard Responsibilities 
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3. Composite of Training 
A training composite was created to measure 18 different types of training 
available to these security officers, including loss prevention techniques, customer 
service and tenant relations, security technology, report writing, working with police, 
working with firefighters, working with emergency response units, suspicious packages, 
suspicious people, terrorism-related emergencies, patrolling inside and outside facilities, 
reporting emergencies, building evacuations, National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) training, a key feature of which is the Incident Command System (ICS), Critical 
Incident Management System (CIMS) training, performing regular emergency drills, 40-
hour enhanced security guard training, and terrorism training from the NYPD Shield 
program. This composite was formulated using a Likert 5-point scale, and the types of 
training were measured by the number of different types of training received by the 
security officer. One to three types of training equals 1 on the Likert scale. Four to seven 
types of training equals 2, eight to eleven types of training equals 3, twelve to fifteen 
types of training equals 4, and sixteen to eighteen types of training equals 5 on the Likert 
scale. 
Of the 341 respondents, 7 or 2.1 percent reported receiving zero types of training. 
Twenty-seven or 7.9 percent reported receiving 1 to 3 types of training. Fifty-nine or 17.3 
percent reported receiving 4 to 7 types of training. Eight-nine or 26.1 percent reported 
receiving 8 to 12 types of training. One hundred four or 30.5 percent reported receiving 
12 to 15 types of training, and 55 or 16.1 percent reported receiving 16 to 18 types of 
training, as depicted in Table 24. Of the security officers 72.7 percent reported receiving 
between 8 and 18 of the different types of training that were available to them. 
 128
Table 24.   Training Composite 
 
Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 25, 179 or 52.5 percent reported 
receiving loss prevention training. One hundred sixty-two or 47.5 percent of the 
respondents reported that they did not receive loss prevention training. Two hundred 
sixty-nine or 78.9 percent of the respondents reported receiving training in customer 
service and tenant relations. Seventy-two or 21.1 percent of the respondents reported that 
they did not receive customer service and tenant relations, as depicted in Table 26. 
Table 25.   Training in Loss Prevention Techniques 
 




Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 27, 215 or 63 percent reported 
receiving training with security technology, e.g., CCTV, and 126 or 37 percent reported 
they did not receive training in security technology. Two hundred sixty-nine or 78.9 
percent reported receiving training in report writing, and 72 or 21.1 percent reported that 
they did not receive training in report writing, as depicted in Table 28. 
Table 27.   Training in Security Technology 
 
Table 28.   Training in Report Writing 
 
Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 29, 180 or 52.8 percent reported that 
they received training for working with the police, and 161 or 47.2 percent reported that 
they did not receive training for working with the police. 
With regard to working with firefighters, of the 341 respondents 160 or 46.9 
percent stated that they received training, and 181 or 53.1 percent reported that they did 
not, as depicted in Table 30. 
With regard to working with other emergency response units, 170 or 49.9 percent 
reported receiving such training, while 171 or 50.1 percent reported that they did not 
receive such training, as depicted in Table 31. 
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As for reporting emergencies, 273 or 80.1 percent reported receiving such 
training. Sixty-eight or 19.1 percent reported that they did not receive such training, as 
depicted in Table 32. 
Table 29.   Training in Working with the Police 
 
Table 30.   Training in Working with Firefighters 
 
Table 31.   Working with Emergency Response Units 
 




Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 33, 292 or 85.6 percent reported 
receiving training in how to conduct a patrol inside and outside a facility and what to look 
for, while 49 or 14.4 percent reported that they did not receive such training. 
With regard to suspicious people and suspicious packages, 254 or 74.5 percent 
reported receiving training in identifying suspicious packages, and 87 respondents or 25.5 
percent reported that they had not received this training, as depicted in Table 34. 
Two hundred sixty-six or 78 percent of the respondents reported receiving 
training in identifying suspicious people, and 75 or 22 percent reported that they had not 
received training in identifying suspicious people as depicted in Table 35. 
Table 33.   Training in Patrolling Inside and Outside a Facility 
 
Table 34.   Training in Identifying Suspicious Packages 
 




Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 36, 223 or 65.4 percent reported 
receiving training regarding handling terrorism-related emergencies, and 118 or 34.6 
percent reported that they did not receive such training. 
With regard to building evacuations, 217 or 63.6 percent of the respondents 
reported receiving training in building evacuations, and 124 or 36.4 percent reported that 
they had not received training in building evacuations, as depicted in Table 37. 
When asked whether they conducted regular emergency/evacuation drills, 149 or 
43.7 percent of the respondents reported conducting emergency/evacuation type drills, 
while 192 or 56.3 percent of the respondents reported that they did not conduct regular 
emergency/evacuation drills, as depicted in Table 38. Some respondents even wrote on 
the survey sheets that they have never conducted emergency/evacuation drills. 
Table 36.   Training in Handling Terrorism-Related Emergencies 
 
Table 37.   Training in Building Evacuations 
 




Of the 341 respondents in Table 39, 178 or 52.2 percent reported that they had 
received the 40-hour enhanced security guard training. One hundred sixty-three or 47.8 
percent reported that they have not received such training. 
With regard to National Incident Management System (NIMS), a key feature of 
which is the Incident Command System (ICS), which is supposed to be part of the 40-
hour enhanced security guard training, 84 or 24.6 percent of the respondents reported 
receiving such training, and 257 or 75.4 percent reported that they have not received such 
training, as depicted in Table 40.  
With regard to the Critical Incident Management System (CIMS), 76 or 22.3 
percent of the respondents reported receiving such training, and 265 or 77.7 percent 
reported that they did not receive such training, as depicted in Table 41. 
Table 39.   Forty-Hour Enhanced Security Guard Training 
 
Table 40.   Training in NIMS 
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Table 41.   Training in CIMS 
 
Of the 341 respondents, 90 or 26.4 percent reported receiving training from the 
NYPD Shield Unit as depicted in Table 42. The training that is provided by the NYPD 
Shield unit includes Terrorism Awareness for the Security Professional, Vehicle-Borne 
Improvised Explosive Device Security Checkpoint Operations Course, Surveillance 
Detection for Commercial Infrastructure Operators and Security Staff, and Detecting 
Hostile Surveillance. Two hundred fifty-one or 73.6 percent reported that they did not 
receive this training. Compensating for guards who are assigned to the airports (152), 
which are under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
Police, and analyzing the data for security officers who work in buildings under the 
jurisdiction of the NYPD, a slight uptick is apparent in the percentage of security officers 
trained by the NYPD Shield unit to 31.2 percent. In addition, there were 31 security 
officers who had previously received this training from the NYPD Shield unit before 
going to work in the airports. 
Table 42.   Terrorism Training from NYPD Shield Unit 
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E. JOB SATISFACTION 
1. Skills and Abilities 
Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 43, 96 or 28.2 percent reported that 
they disagreed or strongly disagreed that their present job makes good use of their skills 
and abilities. One hundred seventy-seven or 51.9 percent of the respondents reported that 
they agreed or strongly agreed that their present job made good use of their skills and 
abilities, and 68 or 19.9 percent of the respondents were undecided. 
Table 43.   Good Use of Skills and Abilities 
 
2. Employee Satisfaction 
Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 44, 50 or 14.7 percent disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that they were proud to be an employee where they worked. Two 
hundred thirteen or 62.4 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they were proud to be an 
employee where they worked. Seventy-eight or 22.9 percent of the respondents were 
undecided. 
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Table 44.   Proud to Be an Employee Here 
 
Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 45, 178 or 52.2 percent disagreed or 
strongly disagreed when asked whether the most capable employees are always the ones 
selected for promotions. One hundred three or 30.2 percent agreed or strongly agreed that 
the most capable employees are always the ones selected for promotions, and 60 or 17.6 
percent of the respondents were undecided. 
Table 45.   Most Capable Employees Selected for Promotion 
 
3. Instruction and Communications Sufficient  
Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 46, 96 or 28.2 percent disagreed or 
strongly disagreed when asked whether, when assigned work they have never done before, 
they get the necessary instruction to do a good job. One hundred ninety-two or 56.3 percent 
agreed or strongly agreed that, when assigned work they have never done before, they get 
the necessary instruction to do a good job, and 53 or 15.5 percent of the respondents were 
undecided. 
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Table 46.   Necessary Instruction When Assigned New Jobs 
 
Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 47, 119 or 34.9 percent disagreed or 
strongly disagreed that communications from the top management are adequate for them 
to know what is going on in the organization. One hundred sixty-one or 47.2 percent of 
the respondents reported that they agreed or strongly agreed that communications from 
the top management are adequate for them to know what is going on in the organization. 
Sixty-one or 17.9 percent of the respondents were undecided. 
Table 47.   Communications from Top Management Adequate 
 
Table 48 depicts the descriptive statistics for the sample population of 341 
completed surveys from the 401 surveys that were distributed to security officers. The 
chart also depicts the statistical range for each question asked and the maximum and 
minimum of the N group 341. In addition, Table 48 also depicts the statistical mean and 
the standard error for the mean, as well as the standard deviation and the variance for that 
sample population. 
 138







INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly 
New York Police Department 
New York, New York 
